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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OP THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
1. Statement of the Problem
It is the purpose of this dissertation to dis-
cover the criterion or criteria of truth which George
Berkeley uses in establishing his system of thought* Since
the only criteria which appear conspicuously in Berkeley
are sense experience, practical results, and coherence, v/e
shall consider what use he made of them.
After showing the criteria used by Berkeley it
will be desirable to consider his success in their applica-
tion, If coherence is his chief criterion, is his system
coherent? Did he allow a double truth in religion? Was
Berkeley r s later thought a complete reversal of his original
or early position? If so, was the change toward greater or
less coherence? Was his early sensationalism renounced in
later life for the eternal Ideas of Plato? Was he a nomi-
nalist, occasionalist, realist, subjectivist? These and
other allegations in recent writings about Berkeley, would
destroy Berkeleian idealism as a philosophical system if
they could be proved.
2, Sources
i. Berkeley's Works
The works of George Berkeley (1685-1753) which will
r
‘
,
'
.
i
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2be considered in this dissertation are: (1) The Commonplace
Book (CB), written sometime between 1705 and 1708 and pub-
lished in 1871, is a series of disjointed but brilliant
notes in the form of queries, memorandums, and statements
which occurred to Berkeley; (2) An Essay Toward a New Theory
of Vision (NTV) in 1709, is a psychological account of space
or the relation of visible and tangible extension; (3) His
masterpiece, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge (P) in 1709, is a clear statement of his "New
Principle" and his personalis tic idealism. This work is
the first part of a proposed larger work; the second of
which was lost in Italy and the original plan abandoned;
(4) The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (D) in
1713, deals with the absurdity of abstract matter and pro-
motes the principle that being is dependent uoon percipient
living spirits; (5) De Motu (DM) in 1720, is a book on
physics. It is a discussion of the material world under the
category of cause or power; (6) Alciphron or the Minute
Philosopher (ALC) in 1732, unfolds the moral and religious
aspect of his system; (7) Siria (SIR) in 1744, is his final
expression of the universe in its human and divine relations.
In addition to these works some reference will be made to
certain letters and minor works, especially Passive obedi-
ence (1712) which deals with his social and moral philosophy.
There is no textual problem in connection with
Berkeley's works except in the different editions of the

Principles and in the Commonplace Book. Fraser’s edition
of Berkeley’s Complete Works indicates the later additions
to the Principles . His edition of the Commonplace Book is
very unsatisfactory because of errors of omission, tran-
scription, and chronological order. G. A. Johnston’s
edition (1950), following Lorenz, Erdmann, Rossi and Hecht,
is an attempt to correct these errors and is satisfactory
for the most part. More recent and better still is A. A.
Luce’s edition which he calls Philosophical Commentaries
(1944). This work is significant because it preserves
all the marginal notes as well as the strictures and
corrections in the original text. This work discloses the
Johnston edition to be in error at certain points.
ii. Other Sources
There have been a number of books and articles
written about Berkeley but none which deals directly with
the subject of this dissertation. To some extent these
works complicate the problem because the writers differ in
their interpretation of Berkeley’s meaning.
Some of the more important works are as follows:
(1) The editor’s notes and explanations in A. C. Fraser's
edition of Berkeley’s Complete Works (1901). Any serious
study of Berkeley's works will reveal that Fraser's notes
1. Aaron, Mind, Oct. 1931-Apr. 1932, or Luce Hermothena,
XXII (1S37J.

4are not always to be trusted. (2) G. A. Johnstons, The
Development of Berkeley's Philosophy (1923), which does
what its* title suggests. (3) The , searching criticism
of Berkeley’s idealism in R. F. A. Hoernle/, Idealism as
a Philosophical Doctrine (1924), and in his larger, more
complete work. Idealism as a Philosophy (1927). (4) J. M.
Hone and M. M. Rossi, Bishop Berkeley (1931). (5) G. Dawes
Hicks Berkeley (1932). (6) Ingemar Hedenius, Sensationalism
and Theology in Berkeley’s Philosophy (1936), and (7) John
Wild George Berkeley (1936). These works, excluding
Hoernle/
,
promote the view that Berkeleian thought must be
interpreted according to periods because there is a change
in Berkeley's essential position.
On the other hand A. A. Luce in his Berkeley and
Malebranche (1934), an article in Mind (1943) and in his
Philosophical Commentaries (1944) is opposed to this view.
He claims that there is not the alleged change in Berkeley
from sensationalism to Platonism, from nominalism to
conceptualism. 1 The unchanging coherence of Berkeley's
system is at stake.
Another claim, which though not widespread, is
that advanced by Laird and Woodbridge; that Berkeley is a
realist instead of an idealist. This and other claims will
be considered in the body of the dissertation as they arise
in connection with our problem.
1. Luce, "The Alleged Development of Berkeley's Philosophy",
Mind, XL, (Apr. 1943); 141-156.
.••
.
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53. Criterion Defined
This dissertation deals with Berkeley’s criterion
of truth. "Criterion" is a standard of judging; a rule or
test by which facts, principles, opinions and conduct are
tried in forming a correct judgment respecting them".
1
It
is sometimes referred to as a principle which will enable
human cognition to distinguish genuine being from non-genuine
pbeing, truth from error, and reality from appearance. Put
in the form of a question, the problem of a criterion of
truth is stated by Rogers thus: ”What on reflection, justi-
fied us in continuing to hold our confidence in the things
we believe to be true?"
3
A criterion, then, is the test
which we apply to strengthen our confidence and justify our
belief rationally.
Whenever one recognizes a principle, rule or test
as a valid and true test or rule, that criterion is for him
authoritative. But there is no one criterion accepted by
all philosophers; indeed this situation is as John H.
Muirhead has stated, that "no problem goes deeper or lies
nearer the root of the difficulties that divide the leading
types of philosophy in our times'*.^
1. Webster's, NID.
2. Enc. Brit. 522.
3. Rogers, WIT, 7.
4. Muirhead, "The Problem of Truth and Some Principles in
Aid of its Solution", in UCPP, A, 14.

4. What Is Truth?
The terra truth in the phrase "criterion of truth”
is one which is thought easily definable until a clear,
precise, and exact definition is demanded* It has a variety
of meanings in common usage such as: conformity to facts,
a quality of beliefs and feelings, the reality beyond our
experience of it, a quality of judgments, a trait of char-
acter (loyalty), and a valid method of reason. The problem
is frequently complicated by those who make a complete
analysis of the problem and then forget all about it in
the heat of the controversy.
Dr. Eleanor M. Johnson, in her dissertation on
The Essential Nature of Trueness
,
has pointed out certain
distinctions which may be made for the sake of clearness:
(1) between criteria of truth and the nature or definition
of truth, and (2) between the nature of truth and the nature
of trueness. She defines truth as "the system of propo-
sitions acceptable to omniscience”, and trueness as "the
quality or relation which renders them acceptable”. 1 With
this distinction accepted, one would speak of the "criterion
of trueness” and reserve the term "truth” for that system
of propositions which would be acceptable to an omniscient
mind. Although the distinction is an interesting one, it
would be confusing to speak of the trueness of the truth.
1. Johnson, ENT

Common usage makes truth a quality as well as trueness.
James Bis sett Pratt 1 points out three ways in
which the term "truth" is commonly used: (1) as a synonym
for reality or the ontological status of truth; (2) as a
synonym for known fact or verified and accepted belief;
(3) as a quality belonging to an idea or its trueness.
The first might be called "the truth" and be distinguished
from the second as "truths" or "a truth", and the third is
a quality of propositions or trueness.
As a preliminary definition, the following is
proposed: A true proposition is one that corresponds to
its object. Truth then is a quality of propositions,
judgments, or beliefs which render them acceptable. With
this tentative definition before us we shall proceed to
consider in a preliminary way, certain problems of truth,
and criteria of truth; that the total proolem may be more
adequately understood.
5* Problems About Truth
Certain problems about truth arise in connection
with a consideration of the nature of logical method and
structure. One problem is that of atomism versus organicism.
Is truth essentially a quality of propositions or particulars
of experience, each more or less independent, or is truth an
organic system, i.e. a system of true propositions, the
1. Pratt, WIP, 51-52
.
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meaning of which is dependent on the nature of the whole
system?
G. A. Johnston, in a summary paragraph about
Berkeley, states that in every department of his philosophy
"Berkeley is driven by the logic of his thought to abandon
his early particularism in favor of a conception of life
based on organic system."^ Did Berkeley change his view?
Berkeley’s analysis of experience into its
smallest constituent, i *e . idea, quality, "minimum tangible
and "minimum visible", provides evidence that Berkeley’s
view was atomistic, as does the assertion that Berkeley’s
basic propositions are assumptions and that he deduces his
system therefrom. Homer H. Dubs, e.g., challenges
Berkeley’s argument on the grounds that it is purely
deductive from an assumed major premise. But can this be
substantiated? The answer is a part of our problem.
On the other hand, Berkeley's view of spirits, of
the order and system of nature, of reality as an organic
whole of spirits and their ideas, indicates that Berkeley
believed reality and the truth about reality to be essen-
tially an orderly, systematic, coherent whole. Which view
is Berkeleian?
Another problem which is related to the latter
1. Johnston, DBP, 359.
2. Dubs, HI, 81-82.

view of truth is whether truth^ is s rigidly necessary
system of implication, of relations, or whether it in-
cludes, in addition, the empirical order of all that is
involved in experience. The former is sometimes mistakenly
called the coherence view of truth, and the latter the
pragmatic. Percy Hughes has indicated this distinction by
his use of the terms "implication” and ''involvement.” He
says, "Whereas the logic of implication looks toward a
system of propositions based on postulates, the logic of
involvement looks toward a doctrine of causes.
John Dewey, in his Lo gi
c
,
employs the distinction
drawn by Hughes. He says that implication holds between
propositions but not between constituents.
Every case of the causal relation rests
upon some involvement of existential condi-
tion with one another in joint interaction...
The essential consideration is that the
relation is a strictly existential one,
ultimately a matter of the brute structure
of things .. .Reasoning and calculation are
necessary instruments for determining
definite involvements. But the relations
of terms and propositions within reasoning
and calculation (discourse) is implicatory
and non-exis tential
.
If, on the one hand, truth is a body of true
1. Truth is now spoken of as a system of true propositions
2. Blanshard, NT, I, 78.
3. Hughes, "involvement and Implication,” Phil. Rev. XLUII
(1938) 274.
4. Dewey, LOG, 278-279.
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propositions which logically imply each other into a
necessary system-^- and absolute truth is that system in
which nothing remains without and nothing is contingent
within, then one’s view of truth is static or fixed.
There is no new truth but only the discovery of eternal
truth.
Although there may be eternal truths, it is quite
generally agreed that there is on the other hand an empirieal
element in truth and that which is true is to be discovered
in experience.
A view of truth as coherent system, or of truths
or true propositions as constituting the truth, is inclusive
of all that can be inferred from both implication and in-
volvement. There is no absolute, final truth but by the
interpretation and reinterpretation," by the analysis and
synthesis of all experience one can approach the whole
truth or the fundamental nature and meaning of reality.
This will be more evident in the discussion of the co-
herence criterion which follows.
6. Criteria of Truth Proposed by Berkeley.
What shall be the test of the validity of
propositions about experience? How may one verify the
truth or falsity of such propositions? Of the many
1. Blanshard, NT
'.
-
.
.
possible criteria, ^ the only criteria which are important
in Berkeley are sense experience, practical consequences,
and coherence. Also general consent, self-evidence,
intuition, and authority are used at certain points.
i. Sense Experience.
There is evidence that Berkeley appealed to sense
experience as the test of truth, at least in a part of his
system. One is urged to trust the senses and certain
existences are rejected on the grounds that one can have
no idea of the same. On the other hand Berkeley realized
that not all knowledge or experience could be validated
on the basis of the possibility of its being perceived.
Although Berkeley destroyed the gap between the mental and
the physical, this did not help him to verify and validate
his assertions about self, other selves end God.
ii. Practice or Workability.
There is evidence that Berkeley recognized a
pragmatic test as a valid test. In this preliminary
treatment, a paragraph from the preface to the Dialogues
is ample evidence Berkeley says:
General opinion of the world no less than
the design of nature and providence /sb-ow7
that the end of speculation be PractTce or
the improvement an£ regulation of our
lives and actions.^
1. Montague, WK, Cf. Brightman, ITP, 35ff.
2. D, 375.
..
-
.
There is widespread use of the pragmatic test
of truth. It is the test of scientific inquiry. "The
function of consequences as necessary tests of the
validity of propositions"'*' is used extensively not only
by philosophers and scientists but by the ordinary layman
John Dewey, William James and John E. Boodin, independent
follower of William James, are outstanding representative
of this view. Boodin states that
Truth, finally must be tested through the
consequences in the way of conduct or pro-
cedure to which it leads--provided that
we include in these, both the difference
which the object makes to our individual
nature now snd tjje ratification of fur-
ther experience.^
Workability or practical consequences, if fol-
lowed consistently and pursued to the farthest reach of
human experience, points to that which is beyond the
finite, beyond the individuals own limited experience,
and becomes the coherence criterion.
iii. Coherence.
The criterion of coherence is the combined
tests of inclusiveness or entirety, consistency, related-
ness of parts to each other and to the whole, snd of the
whole to the parts. It includes the logic of implication
1. Dewey, LOG, Pref. iv.
2. Boodin, Tr, 316.
3. Coherence will be used in the sense of including both
implication and involvement to the farthest possible
limit unless specified otherwise.
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and involvement. It requires a view of the whole of ex-
perience with some hypotheses about the nature of reality.
It presupposes that the truth about reality, or a body of
true propositions about reality will reveal a coherent
whole of both involvement and implication.
The coherence criterion and view of truth have
been criticized, when erroneously defined as consistency
(implication), as an inadequate view and test of truth
and have also frequently been criticized because they give
no final truth when viewed as involvement.
Arthur Kenyon Rogers^ interprets coherence in the
narrow sense of consistency (implication) and finds it
inadequate. Dubs takes a similar view, interpreting co-
herence as logical implication.
Mere coherence in a system or agreement
with what we already believe cannot be
a sufficient test of truth, unless we are
willing to validate the reasoning of the
insane, and that supporting many outworn
popular prejudices... The only ultimate
criterion of truth is the universe as a
whole
.
Actually then, Dubs is pleading for a coherence
criterion of truth based on implication. However, he
provides for the importance of involvement even in a
deductive system when he states that the "foundations of
knowledge, at least, must be non-deductive . ',yJ
1. Rogers, WIT, 11.
2. Dubs, RI, 28.
3 • Dub s
,
RI
,
26.
.
The second criticism frequently applied to co-
herence as a view of truth and test of truth, is that
there is no truth until we know all truth and that no
truth can be completely tested until all truth is known.
Thus no truth is absolutely final but is subject to
revision in the light of further experience. The criticism
is justified but may apply as well to all other criteria
of any consequence. Intuitions, sense experiences, in-
stincts, authorities etc. must all be judged by a higher
standard; and pragmatism finally "requires all practical
results."^- Hughes states that "the term entire denotes
the criterion of valid inference from involvement."^
This implies the necessity of a persistent application
of the coherence criterion to experience as a whole.
At this point we may raise the questions of
Berkeley’s use of a coherence criterion and whether he
attempted a coherent account of the nature of the whole
of experience and reality. This latter problem is a
significant one as evidenced by the difference of opinion
concerning Berkeley’s system and will receive further
consideration in the body of the dissertation. The
former problem raises the question as to the extent to
which Berkeley applies the logic of implication and to
what extent that of involvement. If Dub's assertion be
1. Brightman, PR, 129.
2. Hughes, "implication and Involvement, 272.
-.
I
.
'
-
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true, that Berkeley* s system is deductive by logical
implication, does not involvement enter the picture via
the major premise?
Berkeley’s attempt to purge his thought or his
propositions about reality of contradictions, inconsist-
encies, the absurd, the inconceivable, the unintelligible,
his realization that the consistency of the Schoolmen was
not enough for truth, and his attempts to prove his case
with the utmost evidence and demonstration, and indicative
of the fact that he applied a coherence criterion.
A passage from Alciphron is a fundamental state-
ment of the coherence criterion and is one which will be
kept constantly before us as we proceed. Crito is saying
that one who makes a true judgment
will not only consider the doubtful and
difficult parts of it, but will take a
comprehensive view of the whole, consider
it in all its parts and relations trace
it to its original, examine its princi-
ples, effects, and tendencies, its
proofs internal and external. He will
distinguish between the clear points,
and the obscure, the certain and the un-
certain, the essential and circumstantial,
between what is genuine and what is
foreign...He will silence his passions,
and listen to truth... He will balance the
force of his understanding with the dif-
ficulty of the subject, and, to render his
judgment impartial, hear evidence on all
sides ...-*
1. ALC. vi, #32
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CHAPTER II
GENERAL STATEMENT OF BERKELEY* S METAPHYSICS
In the preceding chapter we have viewed the
general scope of the problem of the dissertation and
also certain definitions relevant thereto. Since our
problem is Berkeley's use of criteria of truth in es-
tablishing his system, a general statement of his meta-
physics, the center of his philosophy, seems fitting be-
fore we proceed to examine the specific problem.
George Berkeley's philosophy is an interpretation
or theory of the universe in terms of mind or spirit and
ideas. Thus his idealism was a direct and deliberate chal-
lenge to the materialism of Hobbes and others of his time.
The universe consists of spirits and their ideas, of per-
ceiver and the perceived, of spirits and their relations
to each other. Esse est percipi e t oercipere expresses
these existences. As far as I can discover, Berkeley does
not use the above Latin statement in this form, although
practically every work about Berkeley uses it as though it
were quoted, especially the first part: esse est percipi .
In the Commonplace Book Berkeley says: "Esistence is
percipi, or percipere";
1
and in the Principles he says
concerning sensible things: "Their esse is percipi
.
1. CB, 426.
2. P, #3.
-
This to-be-is-to-be-perceived doctrine is central in
Berkeley’s doctrine of matter. The objects which we
perceive exist only when and so long as a mind perceives
them. Thus when real objects have no existence in my
mind, they exist in some other mind. It follows that
nature as a whole must exist as the object of pe rception
for the eternal and all-inclusive mind which we call God.
Objects of perception or immediate sense pres-
entations are called ideas. Material or corporeal things
have no existence except as ideas. Berkeley denies the
existence in matter of' both primary and secondary quali-
ties and substitutes for quality-inhering-in-substance,
ob ject-for-a-mind . Thus he tries to substitute a rela-
tionship which will be intelligible and verifiable in
terms of experience for one which cannot be verified and
is not intelligible .
^
How does he distinguish, if at all, between
ideas of sense and ideas of imagination? between the real
and the imaginary? the former are "more strong, lively,
and distinct", have a "steadiness, order and coherence"
not found in the latter, and are not dependent on or
excited by a human will.
For example a real table is known to be real
because of its relation to other objects, the possibility
of verifying it in further experience and because it is
1. Hoernld', IP, 93
**
.
*
,
*
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not created by ray will. An imaginary or dream table can
be recreated by imagination or memory and its distinguishing
characteristics are not usually as strong or vivid, certain-
ly not as coherent with the rest of experience.
Berkeley’s distinction between the real and
imaginary in ideas absolves him from the charge of a merely
subjective mentalism. Everything is as real as ever.
There is a rerum natura . His denial of matter is not a
denial of physical things. We perceive real objects and
infer from them as cause, not an unknowable -somewhat con-
ceptualized as matter, but their true cause and producing
agent, God.
Knowledge is either immediate or mediate. Im-
mediate knowledge is either of things or of ourselves;
i .e . things by way of sense perception and ourselves by
non-sensory notions. Mediate knowledge is of other selves,
God, mental activities, and relations. By reflection we
infer the existence of other selves and God. The term
"notion ' 1 received a specialized meaning in Berkeley’s
usage. It refers to a legitimate knowledge of spirits
(for example) which is not of the type of sensation or
what is present-to-sense
.
Berkeley emphasizes the distinction between the
active and the passive; between the te rceiver and the
perceived; between mental act and object or idea. It is
of the nature of spirit to be active. Thus all activity

is mental activity or activity of a spirit. And nature
as the totality of objects which we perceive by the
senses, is the passive element in perception, is a pres-
entation to the mind.
Finite spirits may discover or may create rela-
tions. The general laws of nature are discovered universal
relations. Moral law is a kind of natural lav; grounded in
the nature of God. Moral laws may be deduced from the
"eternal rules of reason" and from the application of
utility and value to experience.
God is the most real reality in the universe.
Other spirits and also ideas have degrees of reality de-
pending upon their dependence upon God. This is an
anticipation of F. H. Bradley* s well-known doctrine of
degrees of reality.
1
All experience points to him. He
is omnipotent and eternal. He knows and comprehends all
things and exhibits these things to us as nature, accord-
ing to certain rules which are the laws of nature. He is
"the force that produces the intellect that orders, the
I
m2goodness that perfects all things.
Berkeley gives to the Mosaic account of Creation
a rather unusual interpretation when he asserts: "My
7
doctrine excellently corresponds with the Creation" and
at the same time that sensible things "existed from all
1. Bradley, AP, 359^400
2. SIR, #320.
3. CB, 351.
*.
20
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eternity in the Divine Intellect and then became perceptible
(i.e. were created) in the same manner and order as described
in Genesis. 1,1 The unusual interpretation leads to contra-
diction when he asserts that God produces things (or ideas)
and at the same time asserts that ideas existed from all
eternity in the Divine Intellect.
God is the first, efficient and final cause. He
is the key to the unity of the universe, its order and its
meaning. Finite spirits and the world are not separate
entities but are conjoined in a whole, involved one with
the other, finding their meaning in the Supreme Spirit,
or God.
Berkeley’s idealism is usually called spiritual
pluralism because he regards ultimate reality to be a
society of spirits dependent upon a Supreme Spirit or God.
We shall proceed now to a more detailed con-
sideration of the criteria of truth which Berkeley used in
various aspects of his system, beginning with his theory
of nature. In this and further considerations, we shall
keep before us some of the following questions: Is
Berkeley’s treatment of the problem consistent and inclu-
sive? Are there changes in Berkeley’s thought in the
direction of a more coherent system? What is the signi-
ficance of proving a point of view inconsistent, incom-
1. Lady Percival Letter

prehensible, absurd, repugnant, inconceivable? Upon what
grounds are hypotheses set up and how is the truth
demonstrated, or verified? Is Berkeley 1 s use of other
criteria contributory to a coherence criterion?

CHAPTER III
CRITERIA OP TRUTH IN KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE
The key to Berkeley’s system as a whole is the
personalistic intuition that ’'nothing properly hut persons,
i.e. conscious things do exist. All other things are not
so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons."^
Thus Berkeley’s Universe is composed of active spirits and
passive ideas. Ideas exist only in relation to percipient
mind; "esse is psrcipi ." Nature is the totality of ob-
jects, including one’s own body, which are perceived by
the senses. Nature does not have an absolute, independent
existence, existence out of relation to all minds, but is
the "Language whereby the Governing Spirit" 2 communicates
with other spirits, and the means whereby a finite spirit
or mind communicates with other finite spirits or minds.
The cause of ideas is not matter but spirit. Berkeley
approaches the problem of nature from the angle of the
possibility of knowledge.
Berkeley was opposed to the naturalism and
materialism of Hobbes and others, because of its conse-
quent irreligion and atheism. He believed that harmony,
unity, and coherence were not impossible ideals in form-
ing a theory of nature.
1. CB, 24.
2. P, #44; Cf. ?, #148; NTV #147.
. ,
.
*
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Thus he set up certain hypotheses and proceeded
to develop his system in accord with them. Part of our
problem is to discover whether these hypotheses or prin-
ciples are assumptions from which Berkeley deduced his
other principles by implication or whether the original
proposition is itself grounded in experience and tested
through further experience. Dubs x e.g. finds Berkeley’s
system a deductive one, such that if the original
2premise is challenged the whole structure falls.
Berkeley’s "esse is percipi" and his iramateri-
alism are basic principles in his theory of nature. We
shall turn now to these considerations.
1 • "Esse i s percipi "
Berkeley begins with the individual perceiver
to establish what Hoernl^ calls Berkeley’s "most famous
7
and most paradoxical doctrine", 0 i.e., to be is to be per
ceived; which doctrine is essential to Berkeley’s theory
of nature. "it is evident to anyone who takes a survey
of the objects of human knowledge
,
that they are ideas
of sense or imagination, or objects of mental operations.
Nature is all that is known by sense ideas. Besides all
the endless variety of ideas or objects perceived by the
1. Dubs, RI, 81f.
2. "The existence of a thing consists in its being per-
ceived."
3. Hoernl4, IP, 99.
4. P, #1.
!.
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senses there is also "something which knows or perceives
them... This perceiving, active "being is what I call mind..."'1
By mind Berkeley does not mean any one of his ideas but some-
thing "entirely distinct from them wherein they exist or...
whereby they are perceived. For the existence of an idea
..2
consists in being perceived.
Berkeley then appeals to a fact of general con-
sent ("everybody will allow"3 ), that thoughts, passions,
and ideas of imagination exist in the mind. "it seems no
less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted
on the sense, however blended or combined together .. .cannot
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them."^ He fur-
ther states that he thinks "an intuitive knowledge may be
C
obtained of this by anyone" who will analyze what is meant
by "exist" when applied to sensible things. Every idea or
object of sense is seen, heard, etc., by me or some other
mind
.
The absolute existence of unthinking things
without any relation to their being perceived,
that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their
esse is percipi
, nor is it possible they
should have any existence out of the minds or
thinking things which perceive them.®
It is "a manifest contradiction"^ and "plainly
1 . ?, #2 .
2. P, #2.
3. P, #3.
4. P, #3.
5. P, #3.
6. P, #3, Cf. #4; GB, 426,434,493.
7. P, #4, Cf. #22 "downright contradiction."

25
repugnant"'
1
' according to Berkeley that houses, mountains,
rivers, etc., should exist without being perceived.
In continuing his argument Berkeley appeals to
self-evidence and later to introspective analysis saying:
Some truths there are so near and obvious to
the mind that a man need only open his eyes
to see them... to wit, that all the choir of
heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all
those bodies which compose the mighty frame
of the world, have not any subsistence with-
out a mind, that their being is to be per-
ceived or known, ...So long as they are not
actually perceived by me . . .or . . .any other
created spirit, they must either have no
existence at all or else subsist in the mind
of some Eternal Spirit.
^
It is "unintelligible" and an absurd abstraction
to assert existence independent of spirit. As proof "the
reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own
thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being
perceived
Berkeley still does not rest the proof but goes
on to show the implications of his thesis, especially its
implication for matter which we will consider presently;
he raises and answers fourteen probable objections, in
addition to certain consequences of his principles. He
does not rest his case on the assertion but seeks to prove
his case with all possible evidence, especially its nega-
tive aspect. Sensation was the test of the existence of
1. P, #4, Cf. #22 "downright contradiction."
2. P, #6. Cf. D, 424.
3. P, #6.

ideas or that which the perceiver knows as nature. As
noted he speaks of "intuitive knowledge” and ''obvious”
truths but this is no more than the immediacy and ob-
viousness of the "given” of sense exoerience. The being
or existence of nature is perception.
It should also be noted that Berkeley’s method
and test is empirical or pragmatic when he constantly
appeals to the reader to consult his experience. In the
Commonplace Book , e.g., we find him saying: "Consult,
ramsack your understanding..”-*- It is pragmatic in that
he seeks to find a consistent and satisfying explanation
of that which is given in sense experience. His opposi-
tion to abstract ideas as source of much error is in the
interest of consistency. Its coherence or incoherence
with the rest of his system will become evident later.
Berkeley’s explanation is satisfactory for purposes of
ordinary experience.
2. Immaterial Hypothesis
Berkeley’s immaterialism is a logical result of
his "esse is percipi " principle and his analysis of exneri-
ence . It is impossible to nerceive the alleged material
object; the belief in matter is inconsistent; there is
nothing in nature which needs matter to account for it or
which cannot be accounted for more adequately and con-
1. CB, 585. Cf. P, Introd. # 13,22; P, #8,10,22,24,27,45
.
sistently on another hypothesis. That in addition to the
test of sense experience, Berkeley applied the coherence
criterion to the alleged existence of matter can scarcely
be doubted. Is it more coherent to allow the indeoendent
existence of matter because of general consent, universal
belief, and prejudice, or is it more coherent to be rid of
those things which are inconsistent, contradictory, psycho-
logically inconceivable, unknowable, and unnecessary to an
explanation or an accounting for exDerience as a whole?
In addition to the logical tests of correct reasoning,
Berkeley applies the test of verification in experience,
of all that is involved in a causal explanation. He sought
not only a consistent and satisfactory explanation but a
coherent one. Before proceeding with a more detailed
analysis of Berkeley’s argument, one may well ask: What
does Berkeley mean by matter?
Berkeley does not deny the external-to-my-mind
existence of objects of nature, nor does he deny the
category of substance, but rather the external-to-all-minds
existence of objects of nature, and material substance in
the ’’unknowable somewhat” sense of Locke, ^ and the philo-
sophic ”nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale". The concept of
matter which Berkeley rejects then, is something without
quality but alleged to be the cause of our experiences of
quality, is unknowable but source or cause of the known,
1. Locke, E, II, xxiii, 2
..
'
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and is something hut cannot be described.
Berkeley approached the task of proving immateri-
alism with the attitude that he would let the evidence
decide the verdict. In the midst of his arguments that
there is no such thing as material substance we find him
saying: "But if I were made to see anything absurd or
sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to
renounce this..."
1
The arguments against matter in the Dialogues
are quite similar to those in the Principles . Matter is
not object, archetype, substratum, cause, instrument,
occasion, or something unknown.^ "I challenge you to show
me that thing in nature which needs matter to explain or
account for it. M ^ We shall now consider these and other
arguments as found in the Principles in more detail.
(1). In opposition to Locke, Descartes and others
that primary quslities exist in matter, Berkeley asserts
that primary end secondary qualities are inseparably united
and are ideas. ,f In short, extension, figure, and motion,
4
abstracted from all other qualities are inconceivable.
This is proved by parity of reasoning. (Secondary quali-
ties exist in the mind; primary and secondary qualities
are inseparably united; therefore primary and secondary
1. D, 381.
2. D, 425 ff.
3. D, 439. Cf. 461.
4. P, #10, Cf. DI.
*.
• •
qualities are inseparably united; therefore primary
qualities are in the mind also.) The premises are grounded
in sense or an analysis of sense experience.
29
(2)
. In opposition to those who claim a common
sense apprehension of it, Berkeley proves from experience
that ideas of sense have no stable nature. Therefore
ideas cannot be of matter, since matter is inert and un-
changeable • ^
(3)
. An idea being of the nature of thought, it
is a contradiction for ideas to exist in a thoughtless
p
thing, and how matter should produce an idea in a Spirit
"is what no philosopher will pretend to explain." 3 There
is no necessary connection between matter and ideas. In
fact, existence unconceived and unthought is a manifest
repugnancy. 4 This is true of course on the logic of
Berkeley’s stipulated meanings.
(4)
. The supposition of matter or independent
external bodies serves no purpose. It is not cause, nor
is it necessary for a satisfactory explanation of experi-
ence and reality. 5 To assume matter is a reflection on
God’s purpose and power, for it is to suppose "that God
has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless
and serve no manner of purpose." 6
1 . P, #n. 14, 47.
2. P, #9.
3. P, #50, Cf . 13, 67, 68.
4. P, #23.
5. P, #68, 67, 133 ; Di.
6 • P, #19, Cf
.
20, 23.
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(5)
. If one allows substances to exist outside
the mind, "'Tis impossible the mind should know or per-
ceive them*';
1
even materialists confess that we do not
perceive matter.
(6)
. Matter as "Being in general" is the most
abstract and incomprehensible of all definitions, "is
p
not this a direct repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?
(7)
. Universal concurrent assent of mankind is
no argument for its existence when it involves believing
a contradiction.
3
On the other hand, the "bare possibility"^'
of matter's existing as unknown in the mind of God is worth
consideration but turns out to be a dispute about a word
(i.e. meaning of "unknown").
This is but a partial array of the evidence which
Berkeley produced to disprove materialism. If whatever
exists depends upon being perceived, and if we perceive
only ideas (qualities and things), no perception of matter
is possible and therefore it does not exist. Berkeley's
argument against materialism rests on reasoning from the
"esse is percipi " principle and in addition, on the pragmatic
argument of purpose or a satisfactory explanation. The prin-
ciple of coherence includes the logical and the pragmatic
when it seeks to relate materialism to the whole system and
1. CB, #74.
2 . P, # 17 •
3! P, #54; Cf. 4,9,15,17,22,24, etc.
4. P, #75.
..
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finds that materialism is incoherent. Had Berkeley's
criterion of truth been practical results, he probably
would have accepted the naturalism and materialism of
the times. We shall consider now some of the problems
which arise in connection with Berkeley's view of nature
and his immaterialism. If there is no matter how determine
the difference between the real and the imaginary? If
ideas are real things and all knowledge is confined to
our own ideas, how escape solipsism or subjectivism? If
ideas are passive what is the cause of ideas? If ideas
are dependent for their existence on percipient mind and
if ideas are not connected, how account for the laws of
nature? Is the truth about nature atomistic or organic
system? Not all of these questions will be answered in
the present chapter but will carry over into a considera-
tion of the relations of spirits to ideas.
3 . Problems
i. Ideas of Sense and Ideas of Imagination
Berkeley anticipated it might be objected if all
sense experience is ideas that one could not distinguish
between the real and the imaginary. In the Commonplace
Book he says: "Cause of much errour and confusion that
men knew not what was meant by Reality".^ If this were
true on his principles, his system would not be coherent
1. CB, 796
.*
.
-
-
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or adequate. What is the test cr criterion whereby one
may determine a distinction between ideas of sense and
ideas of imagination. Berkeley says:
The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively
and distinct than those of the Imagination;
they have likewise a steadiness, order, and
coherence, end are not excited at random, as
those which are the effect of human wills -
often are, but in regular train or series...
The ideas of sense are more real, i.e. "more strong, order-
ly, and coherent."^ They are independent of my experience 0
and will, and they have an external reference in this
sense of independence, v/hich is the only legitimate sense
for Berkeley. There is no difference between real fire
and the idea but there is a difference between real fire
and imagined fire.^
The criterion is clearly a reference beyond
sense experience to a total experience. But relations,
which are not items of sense experience, and the cause of
ideas, (not myself), which is not an item of sense experi-
ence, enter in to determine the distinction. Berkeley
brings in, by inference from sense exnerience, an indica-
tion of his theory of reality.
To wind up the discussion of this problem in the
Dialogues
,
Philonous says to Hyles: ,f In short, by whatever
method you distinguish things from chimeras on your scheme,
1. P, #30; Cf. D, 452.
2. P, #33.
3. D, 446.
4. P, #41.
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the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine."'
1
'
This is really no argument, but Berkeley means to show
that his immaterial! sm and his "esse" doctrine does not
deny there is a difference between the real and the
imaginary, or the real and the illusory.
ii. Ideas: Heal Things or Copies?
As noted Berkeley argues against the existence
of matter or any substratum as the-- real thing of which
ideas are copies or effects. "Then are we all involved
in scepticism."^ For then the real thing is entirely out
of our reach, and all that we see, hear, and feel may be
only phantom appearance. Berkeley wanted to bring con-
sistency and substitute a unity for a diversity whenever
possible. The ideas of sense are the real objects,^' he
asserts. There are no intermediate ideas. His theory was
nob a change of things into ideas but "ideas Into things"^
or a recognition of these things as objective, whatever
that may mean. He argues against the concept of unknown
real natures not only repeatedly in the Principle
s
but
in the Dialogues
^
at great length, and in the Commonplace
Book. In this last he says: "the supposition that things
are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, snd
consequently brings in a universal scepticism, since all
1. D, 452.
2. P, #87.
3. D, 452, 439, 446;
474,551.
4. D, 463; P, #38.
5. D, 417, 444, 465.
TVV, #20,30; P, #29-41; CB, 34, 315,
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our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our
own ideas. Berkeley's attempt to resolve the dualism of
thing and idea involves him in another problem.
If knowledge and contemplation is confined to
one’s own ideas, one hears the charge of subjectivism and
solipsism. Is there a universal or public character to
knowledge? If so, can two persons perceive the same idea
at the same time?
In a passage in the Principles which is concerned
about the opinion that "houses, mountains, rivers” and all
sense objects have an existence in the absence of all
realizing Spirits, Berkeley asserts that this is a contra-
diction and then raises the following questions: "For
what are the forementioned objects but the things we per-
ceive by sense? and. What do we perceive besides our own
ideas or sensations? If Berkeley means that ideas are in
the mind, then he is a subjectivist.
It will clarify the problem to note that Berkeley
is substituting two for the usual three elements (object,
idea as copy of object, perceiver) in the knowledge situa-
tion. He leaves out the middle term and calls the object,
idea. And also that the phrase ”in the mind" is somewhat
misleading. Berkeley means "in relation to mind". He says
1. CB, 612; Cf. 424, 886.
2. P, #4.

When I speak of objects as existing in the
mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would
not be understood in the gross literal
sense: as when bodies are said to exist
in a place, or a seal to make an impression
upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind
comprehends or perceives them; and that it
is affected from without, or by some being
distinct from itself.
1
2
However, the object is reinstated as idea (archetype)
in the mind of God.
iii. Ideas are Passive
To be consistent with his concept of causality,
Berkeley thought he must assert the passivity of ideas.
To assert that ideas are active would allow ideas to be
cause, whereas the only cause is spirit. What guarantees
3
constancy? The fixed order of nature or passive ideas,
which do not change. Thus we find him saying that:
All ideas, sensations, notions, or the things
which we perceive, .. .are visibly inactive;
there is nothing of power or agency included
in them... To be satisfied of the truth of
this, there is nothing else requisite but a
bare observation of our ideas... A little at-
tention will discover to us that the very
being of an idea implies passiveness and
inertness in it, insomuch that it is impos-
sible for an idea to do anything or... to
be the cause of anything. 4
The test of the passivity of ideas is in observa-
tion, introspection, or analysis of ideas and also the
logical impossibility of ideas being active by nature and
1. D, 470.
2. Cf. Chapter V for discussion of Archetypes.
3. P, #28-42; SIR, #294-7, 300-318, 335, 359-365.
4. P, #25.
-*
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definition. This is an empirical and a logical test,
logical by stipulation.
The significance of the passivity of ideas as
a problem lies in their relation to God, their relation
to each othex> and their relation to the percipient. Are
they absolutely passive or is there not an active element
in them? And the ultimate problem of harmonizing two
disparate elements is essential for coherence. We only
raise the question here and shall later see its relation
to Berkeley’s total view.
iv. Error Due to Misuse of Words and to Abstract Ideas
”To view the deformity of errour we need only
undress it.” This picturesque statement in the Commonplace
Book describes exactly what Berkeley tried to do in his
writings. One great source of error is an illegitimate
abstractionism which arises from a misuse of words and
results in unintelligibility, inconsistency and impossi-
bility of ideas beings true ideas. Berkeley considered
this problem to be an important one to the development of
the Principles for he devotes most of the Introduction to
this problem.
(1) Words
In the Commonplace Book
,
Berkeley states that
’’words have ruin’d and overrun all the Sciences.” 1 ’’Speech
1. CB, 714
..
.
*
.
.
metaphorical more than we imagine . . .Hence , manyfold mis-
takes.”^ "The endeavoring to express philosophic thoughts
by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties.”2
Two things are apt to confound men in their
reasonings one with another. 1st. Words
signifying the operations of the mind are
taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as
used by the vulgar are taken in some lati-
tude, their signification is confused...
All this remedyed by studying the under-
standing.
Berkeley seriously considered the possibility
of knowledge and truth without the use of words or signs:
"man may arrive at all real truth as well with as without
signs... ”4 "if men would lay aside words in thinking ’ tis
impossible they should ever mistake... So far as we can in
reasoning go without the help of signs there we have
certain knowledge.”'^ Language is deceptive and error
arises from the abstract use of symbols. Thus Berkeley’s
purpose is to lay aside or ”to remove the mist or veil of
words,” 6 by giving them some empirical meaning which would
be limited. His limitation of the word "idea” is an ex-
ample of this.^ One will not be deceived by words if the
referent is a single, undisguised idea.^ But since words
signify relations, mental operations, will, spirits, and
1 .
2
.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7 .
8 .
CB, 178.
CB, 516.
CB, 549.
CB, 895.
CB, 705. Cf. Fraser, W.,
CB, 651; Cf. 497, 708.
CB, 492.
P, Introd. #25.
Ill, 371-372.
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collections of ideas, it is not possible or practical to
use words in such a limited way. It is essential then to
’’define the words we use and never go beyond our ideas”
1
when they signify ideas. Closely connected with the
fallacy of words is that of abstract ideas.
(2) Abstract Ideas
"Much error is occasioned by the opinion that
the mind hath a power of freming abstract ideas. Some
philosophers have built their schemes on just such
ideas, ^ according to Berkeley. It is very difficult to
determine exactly what Berkeley meant by abstract ideas.
He criticizes a view
4
of abstract ideas and then proceeds
to give an indication of some legitimate abstractions.
In the Introduction to the Principles Berkeley states:
’’I do not deny absolutely that there are general ideas,
.. 5but only that there are any abstract general ideas.
What he does deny is that the mind can isolate a similarity
of a number of particulars and frame for itself an idea of
this property which would be distinct from all the rest.
Eerkeley finds abstract general ideas, free from all
particularity unnecessary for either ” communication” or
for the "enlargement of knowledge”.
^
1. CB, 590.
2. D, 464; P, Introd. 23-25.
3. P, Introd. #7-9.
4. P, Introd. #7-9.
5. P, Introd. #12.
6. P, Introd. #14.
.
I find myself able to abstract in one sense
as when I consider some particular parts or
qualities separated from others... But I deny
that I can abstract ... those qualities which
it is impossible should exist so separated;
or that I can frame a general notion by
abstracting from particulars in the manner
aforesaid. . .
^
All ideas are particulars because sense presenta-
tions are necessarily a particular quality or thing.. But
"an idea which considered in itself is particular, becomes
general by being made to represent or stand for all other
particular ideas of the same sort." - Thus a person may
consider a figure as merely triangular without attending
to the particular qualities, and one "may consider Peter
so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without
ft 3framing the .. .abstract idea, either of man or of animal.
What Berkeley is objecting to is "an abstract, general,
„4inconsistent idea.
Berkeley is not opposed to universals or the
general significance of concrete particulars. He says
"things, names, or notions, being in their own nature
particular, are rendered universal" 6 not by their having
an absolute nature but by the relation they bear to the
particulars signified. For "all knowledge and demonstra-
tion are about universal notions..." 6
1. P, Introd. #3.
2. p, Introd. #12.
3. P, Introd. #16.
4. P, Introd. #16.
5. P, Introd. #15.
6. P, Introd. #15.

A more complete statement of the significance
of universals in Berkeley* s system will follow in a dis-
cussion of relations and in a final statement of his
position. Berkeley considered a statement about abstract
ideas essential before his discussion of the subject of
the Principles because among other considerations, mat-
ter is an abstract idea.
Strictly sneaking, if Berkeley were to follow
his terminology consistently an abstract idea cannot exist
because ideas are concrete particulars.
Berkeley rejects the "agreed on all hands"
^
criterion of the truth of abstract ideas in favor of a
view which was built on a demonstration
2
from the parti-
culars of experience. An abstract idea serves no use
5
and is "perfectly inconceivable."^ True ideas are to be
proved by reflection and in experience. 5
v. Certainty of Sense Knowledge
In considering Berkeley's view of truth and his
criterion it is important to point out that whereas in
knowledge of nature he emphasizes the importance of trust-
ing the senses, in his final work Siris he says: "intellect
and reason are sure guides to truth." 5 Did Berkeley change
1. P, Introd. #7.
2. P, Introd. #16.
3. P, Introd. #14, 15.
4. P, Introd. #23.
5. P, Introd. #20.
6. SIR, #264.
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his mind or did he apply a different test because the sub-
ject was different? This question will not receive a final
answer here but we shall only point out to what extent
Berkeley depended upon sense knowledge for truth about
nature •
A few quotations from his early works are as fol-
lows: "We must with the mob place certainty in the senses.""
"Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception."^
"Certainty, real certainty is of sensible ideas. I may be
certain without affirmation or negation. In the Dialogues ,
Philonous says to Hyles: "You do not trust your senses, I
do."^ "Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses.
.
Wood, stones, fire, water... and the like
things... are things that I know. And I
should not have known them but that I
perceived them by my senses; and things
perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived .. .What a jest it is for a
philosopher to question the existence of
sensible things... I might as well doubt
of my own being, as of the bein£ of those
things I actually see and feel.^
In the Dialogues
,
Hylas raises the
trusting the senses when the moon is viewed
foot in diameter; or a square tower seen at
round; or an oar, with one end in the water
question of
as "about a
a distance
»7
1. CB, 753.
2. CB, 705.
3. CB, 744.
4. D, 463.
5. D, 463.
6. D, 446.
7. D, 455.
crooked
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Philonous replies that one is
not mistaken with regard to the ideas he
actually perceives, but in the inferences he
makes from Jnis present perceptions . . .His
mistake lies not in what he perceives im-
mediately .. .but in the wrong judgment he
makes concerning the ideas he apprehends
to be connected with those immediately per-
ceived • . *
When questioned further Philonous makes this illuminating
statement concerning his former positive belief in the
existence of matter; present, non existence. "Before, my
positiveness was founded without examination upon pre-
judice; but now after inquiry upon evidence.
Berkeley is asserting that one should trust the
senses for all the evidence that they carl give. Sense
presentations are given data. Error is in inference or
judgment from the given sense data. "What I understand
or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour
in this." 3
From these quotations it is apparent that the
sense presentations are to be accepted as sense presenta-
tions, the given is given and one cannot judge about
future experience unless the conditions are the same. It
is a wrong inference to suppose the crooked stick will be
crooked when not immersed. The truth about sticks is to
be discovered through more and more experience or on the
1. D, 455-456.
2. D, 456.
3. CB, 82B
.
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basis of more and more evidence. Thus the senses present
the truth of a particular sense datum and no more.
One could wish for some Platonic influence:
"Knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but
in reasoning about them;”
1
whereas Berkeley says: "Foolish
in men to despise the senses. If it were not for them the
mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all..."^ In
"Theaetetus" we find concerning the "esse -percipi theory",
"nothing is which appears."
3
Berkeley says that when things
are perceived: "There can be no doubt of their existence."
To be just to Berkeley, one must point out that
he used certainty in two meanings: the one is analytic, the
other synthetic. The latter is more important in philosophy.
Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of
agreement of ideas--as to identity and
diversity, and real existence vanisheth; of
relation becometh merely nominal; of co-
existence remaineth.4
Mathematical knowledge of relation, tautologies, agree-
ment of ideas etc., are purely verbal. The only real
knowledge is of coexistence or the synthesis of various
non-identical elements together. 0 Berkeley does not
employ the kind of reasoning which unifies and synthesizes
the unlike to any extent until the latter part of the
Dialogues and significantly in Siris The many references
1. Edman, WP, "Theaetetus" , 540.
2. CB, 544.
3. Edman, WP, 502.
4. D, 446.
5. CB, 752.
..
-
g
.
.
-
•
•
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to demonstration^ refer for the most part to mathematical
reasoning. In the latest references in the Commonplace
Book
,
Berkeley says: "Demonstration can he only verbal"^
and ”1 must not pretend to promise much of demonstration.
I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of
pride .
.
This kind of certainty is probably what Berkeley
had in mind when he said:
To be sure or certain of what we do not
actually perceive (I say perceive, not
imagine), we must not be altogether pas-
sive; there must be a disposition to act;
there must be assent, wch is active. May
.
wt do I talk; there must be actual volition.
This is an application of the pragmatic test to determine
the truth of a proposition.
In our treatment of morality in Passive Obedience
we shall note Berkeley’s attempt to found a rigid mathema-
tical or logical ethics, and also note Berkeley’s failure
in this attempt to find a satisfactory and adequate solu-
tion.
Truth is to be discovered in consistent, inclusive
thinking about reality as a whole. It is more than logical
consistency. One must examine whether first premises are
grounded in experience, which is broader than sense experi-
ence •
1. Wild, GB, 30 f.
2. CB, 816.
3. CB, 870.
4. CB, 790.
..
.
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vi • Meaning of M esse is percipi "
Berkeley's "esse is percipi'
1
principle has
occasioned almost endless discussion concerning the
relation between "esse" and "percipi" . There are both
idealists and realists who deny that the causal theory
of perception can be verified or that it is necessary.
Berkeley establishes this principle in two arguments
stated in the Principles . (1) Ideas of sense "cannot
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." This
may be verified "by anyone that shall attend to what is
meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things.
(2) Whoever will question the natural existence of any-
thing, independent of being perceived, "if I mistake not,
perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction."^
One important question is whether Berkeley
meant the principle to be tautologous. May the terms be
exchanged without altering Berkeley's meaning. Most
realists would affirm that "to be" is one thing, "to be
perceived" is another; the latter implies the former but
the former does not imply the latter.
Hoernl^° suggests that it would serve Berkeley’s
purpose just as well if they were not identical but in-
variably connected i.e. one is never found without the
o the r
•
1. P, #3.
2. P, #4; Cf. #6.
3. Hoernle
, IP, 112

Berkeley's universe is a spiritual or ideal one
and although the perceiver and the perceived are altogether
opposed in that one is active and the other passive, there
is evidence that the passive ideas are concreted and blended
together
1
with one another and also in the Unity of Spirit
so that one cannot exist without the other. The relation-
ship is not a logically necessary one of implication; it
seems to be rather one of causal involvement.
Berkeley was opposed to the "Cogito ergo sum" of
Descartes. It was a tautology. This was no proof. The
ego-centric predicament^ is common to man and does not con-
clusively prove the " esse is percipi " principle, but only
that experience is individual and personal. The absolute
existence of the object which in Berkeley's thought would
link this existence with a knowing mind, i.e. the Absolute
Mind or Spirit, means that the object cannot exist other-
wise than as perceiver or perceived. It is necessarily
implied in the nature of reality and is discovered through
the interrelatedness of object and mind in one unity.
Further indication of the import of this principle will
be noted in connection with our discussion of archetypes
and in our discussion of spirits.
1. P, #99.
2. Perry, PPT, 129-130.
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vii. Lav/s of Nature
The will of God "constitutes the laws of Nature.’’"
These laws are not ideas but from the grouping or sequence
of ideas which evince a pattern, a law may be formulated.
Now the set rules or established methods
wherein the mind we depend on excites in
us the ideas of sense, are called the laws
of nature; and these we learn by experi-
ence,... that such and such ideas are ?
attended with such and such other ideas...
^
These laws are discovered through experience and are
formulated "not by disbovering any necessary connection
between our ideas"
3
but by observing that "in general,
that to obtain such and such ends, such and such means
are conducive."^ It is the task of the scientist to
discover the general rules of which the particular event
is the instance. Thus one might say that the observance
of practice or action is the test of truth of the laws of
nature. They are not man-made but discovered in experi-
ence and are conducive to the ends willed by the Author
of Nature .5 These laws are consistent because of the
divine nature. They are not relative to the individuals
practice but are discovered through practice to be God’s
uniform working or will. Practice is the test of truth.
But these laws are not man made nor relative to any one
person’s practice. The final criterion is to be dis-
covered in relation to the whole.
1. P, #32; Cf. D, 447.
2. P, #30.
3. P, #31.
4. P, #31.
5. D, 433.
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viii. Is the Truth about Nature Atomistic or Organic?
There appears to be two contradictory movements
in Berkeley's thought which need to be synthesized. The
first is evidenced by his emphasis on the particular,
passive, inert, items of sense experience. In individual
experience they are separate atoms, and are fixed. On
the other hand these qualities are variable.
An object may be hot to one, cold to another.
Number, unity, motion, etc., are all relative to the
perceiving mind.
1
This could not be explained if one
believed in determinate material substance. On Berkeley's
hypothesis the problem is solved as follows:
Strictly spe aking. . .we do not see the same
object that we feel; neither is the same
object perceived by the microscope .. .Upon
a little thought, men combine together
several ideas, apprehended by divers senses,
or by the same sense at different times...
but observed, however, to have some con-
nection in nature, either with respect to
one name,...when I examine by my other
senses, a thing I have seen, .. .my aim is
only to know' what ideas are connected to-
gether; and the more a man knows of the
connexion of ideas, the more he gay be said
to know of the nature of things.
It does not follow that the senses are not to be trusted
or that they are inconsistent, according to Berkeley but
that one should seek further sense experience in relation
to the thing or collection of ideas. Independently of
any religious consideration, by an analysis and synthesis
1. P, #11-14.
2. D, 464; Cf. 395-396, 421
.*
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of experience, Berkeley preserves system and unity. Prom
the above, it is apparent that truth is not in the data,
truth is not disconnected atoms, but truth is in the con-
nection of data. Although sense experience presents the
data, connection of ideas and co-existence is no item of
mere sense experience, but relation, judgment, and reason
about the sense-data are involved. Nature is an organic
system sustained by the Infinite. It is the Divine
Language, which, however disconnected in finite sense
experience, has an underlying unity that becomes apparent
from the connections of more and more sense experiences,
from the apprehension of the fact that these items are
involved in a system.
This is not Berkeley’s usual argument; it is
rather that there is a ’’steadiness, order, and coherence”
in ideas of sense, "The admirable connexion whereof suf-
ficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
Author.”'*' These ideas are ’’not creatures of my will.
There is therefore some other will or Spirit that pro-
•»2duces them. Since what he produces can be connected
by me then, the Source also must be a mind. Thus nature
is a coherent system and truth about nature is systematic;
but on Berkeley's principles one cannot know this from
1. P, #30; Cf. #36
2. P, #29.
--
*
.
.
sense experience. The certainty of the senses gives only
the certainty of atoms; the relations established by
reason of the connection of ideas, gives the nature of
things or truth.
There is further evidence of this connection
and unity in nature. "Extension, figure, and motion, ab-
stracted from all other qualities are inconceivable."^
Both primary and secondary qualities are inseparably united.
All sensible qualities are alike sensations
and alike real... The objects of sense are
nothing but those sensations combined, blended
or .. .concreted together; none of all which can
be supposed to exist unperceived.
By a diligent observation of the phenomena
within our view, we may discover the general
laws of nature, and from them deduce other
phenomena. I do not say demonstrate ; for
all deductions of that kind depend on a
supposition that the Author of Nature always
operates uniformly, and in a constant ob-
servance of those rules we take for prin-
ciples which we cannot evidently know.
3
In the argument of the Principles Berkeley allows
the "bare possibility" of opinions being true to pass for
an argument that it is so. He says:
As for all that compagnes /Structure or coherent
system7 of external bodies you contend for,
I shall grant you its existence, though you
cannot either give me any reason why you be-
lieve it exists, or assign any use to it when
it is supposed to exist.
1. P, #10.
2. P, #99.
3. P, #107.
4. P, #22.
.
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Although there Is a unity in nature, an in-
volvement of things with each other, and although one
can by induction formulate general laws which will be
found to operate uniformly for further deduction, yet
truth is not static, it is not fixed, we cannot know
absolutely without the verification from further experi-
ence. Berkeley uses the empirical approach and discovers
certain laws or universal propositions but these are in
turn subject to ratification and revision in the light
of further experience. This goes beyond a pragmatic
criterion and a pragmatisms view of truth, to the co-
herence criterion of the systematic consistency and
coherent inclusiveness of all experience.
In addition, the design which Berkeley notes in
nature and the ''wonderful art and contrivance" wherewith
our faculties are adjusted to the ends and purposes for
which they were designed are a further evidence of co-
herence and of Berkeley's recognition of the coherence
criterion.
This aspect of Berkeley's system will receive
further consideration in connection with the ’’chain" or
Sirls, which shows the essential interrelations of
reality
.•
'
.
‘
.
Berkeley’s universe is a unity of active spirits
and passive ideas. Ideas have no absolute independent
existence but exist only in relation to percipient mind:
“esse is percipi . " Nature is the totality of the objects
of sense experience. Valid knowledge of nature depends
upon what can be sensed. Error is in a wrong inference
about sense experience. Berkeley’s proof is built par-
tially on the general consent that secondary qualities
exist only in the mind. Since the primary qualities can
not be separated from the secondary, both exist in rela-
tion to mind. Berkeley appeals also to an introspective
analysis of one’s own experience, to the absurdity of
existence independent of spirit, and to the adequacy of
this hypothesis to account for experience and reality.
This latter is not adequately articulated here but
Berkeley finds laws, order, coherence, design and other
evidence that a mind or will independent of finite wills
is producing ideas of sense or nature in finite experi-
ence
.
Inseparably connected logically and empirically
with esse -percipi is Berkeley's immaterialism. Matter is
unnecessary indeed contradictory in a coherent account of
reality. Its existence cannot be empirically verified.
It is incoherent to assert that matter is ultimate as well
as mind; that an "unknowable somewhat" can communicate
ideas as well as mind is "repugnant", contradictory, in-
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consistent, and imcomprehensible . To hold the hypothesis
that matter is object, archetype, substratum, cause,
instrument, occasion, or something unknown but necessary,
is to hold an hypothesis which is contradictory to what
can be verified, does not account for sense experience
and is not the most coherent hypothesis. Had Berkeley*
s
criterion been practical results, he need not have needed
to consider the coherence or incoherence of matter. The
interrelations of all experience into a consistent
coherent whole is consistent with immaterialism.
If real things are ideas, how does Berkeley
distinguish between the real and unreal. He distinguishes
between ideas of sense and imagination on the ground of
the cause of ideas and in addition by the order, coherence,
and design in ideas of sense.
He does not articulate clearly, the relation of
ideas as perceived by the finite to ideas in the Infinite
mind. His later doctrine of archetypes provides this lack.
Wrong use of words and inconsistent abstract
ideas are sources of error and incoherence.
The certainty of sense knowledge is overemphasized,
but corrected in his later works.
There is a coherent design in nature, a connected-
ness of ideas, a blending of particulars in marked contrast
to the disconnected passive particulars of sense experience.
This synthesis is not an idea but an inference from ideas.
-*
.
.
.
.
.
u,The more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more
he may he said to know of the nature of things. 11
Although sense experience cannot provide the idea
of coherence, Berkeley everywhere saw and inferred coherence.
Although he emphasizes practical results, his tendency to
see wholes, law, order, design and consistent and coherent
system goes beyond a pragmatic view and criterion of truth.
,,
.
CHAPTER IV
KNOWLEDGE OF ONE’S SELF AND OF OTHER FINITE SELVES
In the opening paragraph of the Principles
Berkeley says:
It is evident to anyone who takes a survey
of the objects of human knowledge, that
they are either ideas (1) actually imprinted
on the senses, or else such as are (2) per-
ceived by attending to the passions and
operations of the mind, or lastly (3) ideas
formed by the help of memory and imagination,
either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in
the aforesaid ways.
1
Classifications (1) and (3) are clear but (2) "such as
are perceived by attending to the passions and operations
of the mind" has caused some difference of opinion.
Hicks^ believes that the reference here is to Locke’s
simple ideas of sense, simple ideas of reflection, and
complex ideas; and that he afterward stressed ideas of
sense and ideas of imagination. This last is true but
I believe as does Johnston0 , that grammatically the "such
as" refers to "objects of human knowledge” and not to
ideas of sensation. It may be objected that he says
"perceived” which means but one thing, sensation. How-
ever, Berkeley does not say "ideas" but rather that there
is a class of objects of knowledge perceived or known by
attending to the passions and operations of the mind.
1. P, #1.
2. Hicks, BER, 109 f.
3. Johnston, DBP, 143 ff
.,
.
.
.
.
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It is perhaps significant that in the first
edition of the Principles , Berkeley does not say anything
about this classification, knowledge of the "passions
and operations of the mind", intending this omission to
be covered in Part II of the Principles along with know-
ledge of spirits. It is well known that he intended to
write a second part from references in the Commonplace
Book
,
from the Preface to the Dialogues ? and from a
letter to Samuel Johnson, June 25, 1729.
As to the Second Part of my treatise con-
cerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
,
the fact is that I had made a considerable
progress in it; but the manuscript was
lost about fourteen years ago, during my
travels in Italy, and I never had leisure
since to do such a disagreeable thing as
writing twice on the same subject.
To compensate for the loss of the Second Book
Berkeley added some material to the second and third
editions of the Principles concerning our knowledge of
spirits
•
One such addition is in connection with certain
basic definitions in Berkeley’s attempt to erect "a firm
system of sound and real knowledge". He says:
Thing or Being .. .comprehends under it two
kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous...
to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are
active, indivisible substances: the latter
are inert, fleeting, dependent beings,
which subsist not by themselves but are
supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual
substances .(.. .We may be said to have some
knowledge or notion of our own minds, of
1. D, 576

spirits and active beings, whereof in a
strict sense we have not ideas. In like
manner we know and have a notion of rela-
tions between things or ideas which
relations are distinct from the ideas or
things related, inasmuch as the latter
may be perceived by us without our per-
ceiving the former. To me it seems that
ideas, spirits, and relations are all in
their respective kinds the objects of
human knowledge...; and that the term
•idea’ would be improperly extended to
signify everything we know or have any
notion of).
1
Thus Berkeley introduces a special significance for the
term "notion" to apprehend that which is active, i.e.,
spirits, mental activity and relations. This is a
result of his analytic and synthetic logic. His analysis
of the knowledge situation had shown that there is be-
sides the objects known "a something which knows or per-
ceives them, and exercises diverse operations, as willing,
imagining, remembering about them."^ Since ideas are
passive, Berkeley asserted that we have no ideas of our-
selves or other spirits and no ideas of the operations
of our minds and relations. On the other hand, Berkeley
must show that we do have knowledge of ourselves, other
selves and God.
What are notions really? Hoernle'" asserts that
it is merely a verbal invitation to attend
to the difference between knowledge of
objects and knowledge of acts, without
telling us what the difference is.°
1. P, #89. Material in parenthesis added in 2nd ed.
Cf. P, #27.
2. P, #2.
3. Hoernle', IP, 89.

It is somewhat easier to say what they are not than what
they are. It is clear that they are not sense ideas and
they are not abstract ideas. "The notion is a concept
or universal, present to the mind and having as its
objects spirits, mental operations, and relations,’^
says Johnston. Berkeley says of notion:
I have some knowledge or notion of my
mind, and its acts about ideas...What I
know, that I have some notion of....All
relations including an act of the mind, we
cannot so properly be said to have an
idea, but rather a notion of the relations
and habitudes between things. But, if in
the modern way, the word ’idea’ is ex-
tended to spirits, and relations, and
acts, this is, after all, an affair of
verbal concern, but the meaning is
distinct
.
Thus notion is a term which Berkeley uses to distinguish
the knowledge which one has of spirits, mental operations
and the relations between things from passive sense
presentations or ideas. If, however, one wishes to use
the word idea in both kinds of knowledge, one should not
forget that the meaning is distinct.
i. Knowledge of Self.
Can one know oneself? There is no doubt in
Berkeley's mind as to the answer. In the Dialogues,
Philonous says: ,J I know what I mean by the terms, I and
myself and I know this immediately and intuitively..."^
1. Johnston, DBP, 168.
2. P, #142. Cf. D, 450.
3. D, 447-449. Cf. DM, #21

58
"My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate
knowledge of...” 1 wWe comprehend our own existence by
inward feeling or reflection”.
2
"I do not know that,
I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as cer-
tainly as I know my ideas exist” Thus knowledge of
tbe existence of oneself is immediate and is an inward
feeling or reflection or consciousness and as certain
as the existence of ideas. Thus the test of self-
existence is an immediate feeling or consciousness.
A more complete analysis might have shown
Eerkeley that consciousness of myself as knower or self-
consciousness is not the first or an immediate kind of
knowledge but is the result of more mature analysis of
the knowledge situation. The consciousness of myself,
of the operations of the mind, of the fact that the know-
ing self differs from the objects known follows from an
attempt to reason about or think coherently about experi-
ence and its constituents.
In the early entries of the Commonplace Book ,
^
questions about self-knowledge are asked, questions which
have an obscure answer because Berkeley had not yet
established the distinction between knowledge of ideas
and knowledge of spirits and relations. He defines the
1. D, 447-449. Cf. DM, #21.
2. P, #89.
3. D, 447. Cf. P, #2, 27, 135-142.
4. CB, 25, 44.
..
.
.
.
soul as "only a complex idea, made up of existence.
willing, and perception in a large sense."-*- Later
entries seem to show a view similar to Hume, especially
581-588 that "mind is a congeries of perceptions," or
that self, soul, and understanding are merely names for
collections of ideas. Johnston suggests that although
Berkeley expounded this view, "certain practical con-
siderations made it impossible for him to rest in it."*
2
Luce in Philosophical Commentaries^ reinforces this view
by showing that certain items are marked with a plus
sign, concerning which he says:
I am inclined to think that Berkeley used
it as a sort of obelus, setting it against
those entries which he found he could not
use, whether because (a) irrelevant to
his final argument, or personal, or trivial,
or (b) representing discarded views. 4
The first item in that series which has this sign
reads: TtWe think we know not the soul because we have no
imaginable or sensible idea annex’d to that sound. This is
the effect of prejudice."
5
This item, however, has the
following inserted later.
Certainly we do not know it. This will
be plain if we examine wt we mean by the
word knowledge. Neither doth this argue
any defect in our knowledge no more than
our not knowing a contradiction. 5
1. CB, 156.
2. Johnston, CB, ed. notes P, 137, 586.
3. Luce, PC, items numbered 576, 576a, 577, 578, 579, 580,
581, 582.
4. Op. cit., xxv.
5. CB, 581; Luce, PC, 576.
6. CB, 582; Luce, PC, 576a.
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In the following items it is suggested that "the
very existence of ideas constitutes the soul/’; that ’'con-
sciousness, perception, existence of ideas seem to he all
one,” that "mind is a congeries of perceptions".
It is doubtful that these entries have any
significance except to show that Berkeley considered them.
They show his struggle for a complete and precise expression
of what constitutes a self or soul and an application of a
coherence criterion of truth.
One of the early questions in the Commonplace
Book is "Whether identity of person consists not in the
will?"-*- ^Having raised the question he opposes what he
considered Locke’s view,
2
that personal identity is linked
with consciousness so that unless I am thinking about or
am conscious of what I did or was a year ago, I do not
recognize myself as the same person. Berkeley believes
that personal identity is connected more especially with
the will or conative experience and not alone writh think-
ing. A man asleep is potentially conscious in two senses:
Naturally in that he will be conscious when he awakes; and
praeterna turally, inasmuch as he exists in the mind of
God.^ Thus God guarantees his spiritual existence and the
coherence of the universe.
1. CB, 200.
2. CB, 206.
3. CB, 208.
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Through memory I am conscious of myself as the
same person but unless I am conscious of myself as con-
sciously active I do not have awareness of myself. Thus
Berkeley stresses activity as the essence of the mind or
spirit. Activity is willing. "While I exist or have any
idea, I am eternally, constantly willing”. 1 This is an
overemphasis on the conative aspect of personality.
Berkeley also states that "the mind. Spirit, or
Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks,
acts and percei\Tes” It is the Something which perceives
the objects of sense and exercises operations about them
such as, "willing, imagining and remembering”.^ Although
the functions or operations of the mind may be distinguished
according to understanding and will; and later intellect, "
these are included as a unity "in the word Spirit--by which
I mean all that is active".^ Consciousness as a combina-
tion of understanding and thinking and willing, as the
relation between the past and the present through memory,
is person. The person is essentially a unit, indivisible
with some power of self determination and activity.
Berkeley’s original intuition that "nothing
properly but persons, i.e., conscious things do exist",
^
1. CB, 803.
2. D, 448.
3. P, #2.
4. SIR, #2 54.
5. CB, 860. Cf. 623,
6. CB, 24.
683, 685, 756, 790, 803, 833, 845, 853, etc
.

is followed by a mature reflection in his final work
which is similar to Siris : "Upon mature reflection, the
person or mind of all created beings seemeth alone in-
divisible, and to partake most of unity."'*' The one is
based on intuition and the other on mature reflection, or
testing by sense and reason, coherent inference from all of
experience. The former is in need of verification; the
latter is essentially a transcendental view based on
experience, reasoning about experience, and a considera-
tion of the most coherent hypotheses. But in between
these two statements, there have been some "misty flats"
and some "drifting to and fro." No know ledge of spirits
was possible if knowledge is limited to passive ideas.
The self as a unity is destroyed if the mind is only a
congeries of perceptions, if there is no center of reference
to judge succession and if the elements in mind or spirit,
i.e., understanding and will, are separate entities. Al-
though Berkeley’s analysis leads to division or separation
of elements, his discovery of the essential unity of the
universe and the knowing self evince his use of s coherence
criterion of the truth, for unless there is a unity in
human experience of succession, of identity and difference,
there can be no reasoning by reference to that which is
other than the present sense impression.
1. SIR, #347
..
.
ii. Knowledge of Other Finite Spirits
It would be inconsistent with Berkeley’s
principles to claim an immediate knowledge of other
selves. The knowledge which we have of other spirits
or persons is a mediate knowledge, the product of two
immediacies: knowledge of self, and knowledge of sense.
In the Dialogues , Berkeley says "we have neither im-
mediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the
existence of other finite spirits.”-
1
- The knowledge
which we have of spirits is not intuition, sense experi-
ence, or logical demonstration; but since of my own mind
and ideas I have immediate awareness, it is by the help
of these that I "do mediately apprehend the possibility
p
of the existence of other spirits." The same thing is
expressed in the Principles :
The knowledge I have of other spirits
is not immediate, as is the knowledge
of my ideas, but depending upon the
intervention of ideas, by me referred
to agents or spirits distinct from
myself, as effects or concomitant
signs . .
.
It is evident that I know the existence of other persons
by their operations or the ideas their agency excites in
me. These persons are not themselves phenomena or sense
presentations but their secondary agency affects sense
presented phenomena. Euphranor says he does not really
1. D, 450.
2. D, 447.
3. P, #145.
.
see Alciphron as an individual thinking thing, "but only
such visible signs and tokens as suggest" and then he
infers the invisible thinking principle or soul.
1
This
is stated in the Principles also.
It is plain that we do not see a man—
if by a man is meant thst which lives,
moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--
but only such a certain collection of
Ideas as directs us to think there is
a distinct principle of thought and
motion, like to ourselves, accompanying
and represented by it."
We comprehend or have a notion of the existence of other
spirits by reason,? on the ground of the sense experience
excited in us by their agency, on the ground of analogical
reasoning and on the ground of a coherent view or hypoth-
esis of reality.
Knowledge of other spirits leads directly to
knowledge of God^ and all the evidence for other finite
spirits is stronger and more conclusive evidence for the
\
existence and knowledge of God. And everything that
proves man, proves God.'
rj
Berkeley is certain of the existence of other
spirits but in being consistent with himself, he cannot
allow them to be ideas nor can he allow knowledge of them
with the immediacy of one’s own consciousness because each
person has only his own consciousness.
1. ALC, iv, #5.
2. P, #148.
3. P, #89.
4. P, #145, 146, 29; CB, 406.
5. P, #147.

Hicks" finds Berkeley’s account inconsistent in
that an inference of the existence of other finite spirits
is not immediate but analogical and his argument is not
compatible with the grounds for rejecting the occasionalist
theory of matter. If Berkeley accepts the existence of
other spirits on the evidence of the ideas they excite in
me, why may not matter claim a similar existence and why
may one not have a mediate knowledge of matter or a
notion of it? The rejected matter as defined by Berkeley
is inert and has no agency in it. Thus one could have no
notion of it. Berkeley’s rejection of matter is also
grounded in the fact that it is unnecessary as a hypothesis
since there is a real objective world, whereas the existence
of other agency is essential to account for the ideas which
are not due to my agency. The belief in other finite
spirits is grounded in what I experience in myself and also
in a consistent and systematically complete view of the
universe
.
1. Hicks, BER, 147-150
.*
•
•
.
-
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3. Ideas and Archetypes
Do ideas of sense have an absolute and independent
existence? Throughout his Commonplace Book and Principles
,
Berkeley gives an ansv/er to this question by (1) defining
absolute existence as existence out of relation to any and
all minds, and therefore unknowable; and by (2) restrict-
ing existence to that which is perceived by me and when not
by me, by some other finite mind and if not by some finite
mind, by the Infinite Mind, But Berkeley does not discuss
in any adequate fashion perceived existence in relation to
the Infinite Mind. It is an important question because it
is connected with the public character of knowledge and the
unity of the universe.
In the above mentioned works Berkeley does not
specifically deny archetypes except when they are defined
in material or absolute terms as follows: "The v/ord thing,
as comprising or standing for idea and volition, usefull;
as standing for idea & archetype without the mind, mis-
chievous & useless."**' The key phrase is "without the mind"
and does not deny archetypes but only that they have an
existence independent of all minds. In another reference
in the Commonplace Book
,
Berkeley is contrasting "Ideas
of Sense" and "Ideas of Imagination" and in this contrast
connects ideas of sense with real things or archetypes but
1. CB, 701
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this contrast does not distinguish between the sense idea
and the archetype because this was not the contrast
emphasized. He says: 11 Ideas of Sense are the Real things
or Archetypes. Ideas of Imagination, Dreams, etc., are
copies, images, of these." 1 Later, as we shall note,
Berkeley draws the contrast between ideas of sense and
archetype s
.
Certain references in the Principles are similar
to those of the Commonplace Book . Speaking of ideas,
Berkely says: "Neither they nor their archetypes can exist
in an unperceiving substance."
2
This does not prove that
Berkeley believed in archetypes but the implication is that
they do exist but not in an unperceiving substance.
A similar meaning is confused by Berkeley's use
of the phrase "without the mind", which means outside of a
relation to any mind. Thus he denies that ideas "are
resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind .
"If they (Ideas) are looked on as notes or images, referred
to things or archetypes existing without the mind then are
we involved all in scepticism." Berkeley does not object
to unknown ideas in the mind of God (unknown to us), if
this does not involve a belief in matter. "It is in effect
no objection against what we have advanced to wit that there
1. CB, 835.
2. P, #9.
3. P, #90, italics mine. Cf. P, #48.
4. P, #87, italics mine.
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is no senseless unperceived substance."'1'
The closest Berkeley comes to a positive statement
in the Principles is that "all sensible qualities are alike
sensations and alike real; that where the extension is,
there is the color, too, to wit, in his mind, and that their
archetypes can exist only in some other mind." 2 This, "some
other mind", is probably the divine mind.
This is seen to be the case in the Dialogues
where his doctrine of archetypes is more explicitly treated.
Hylas and Philonous in a discussion of sameness and similar-
ity come to the conclusion that archetypes are necessary.
But contrary to the materialists whose archetype is material,
Philonous says:
So may you suppose an external archetype
on my principles, --external, I mean, to
your own mind: though it must be supposed
to exist in that mind which comprehends
all things... 3
This is an important statement because it
guarantees the reality of the objective world, without
which there can be no system or consistency, no verifica-
tion. Berkeley definitely escapes solipsism. The universe
is one system, the system of the Infinite Mind. The whole
system of nature with its laws is "immense, beautiful.
1. P, #71. Cf. 76,77.
2. P, #99.
3. D, 468. Cf. D, 457
rl
glorious beyond expression", and is not many minds but one
"all perfect mind."-'- It is one coherent whole.
Berkeley’s view of archetypes makes his system
more coherent with the facts of experience and the demand
for some permanence and identity, by the substitution of
an eternal all-embracing mind or unity for that of a
multiplicity of finite minds. What now is the relation of
ideas to archetypes? We shall consider this through
Philonous ’ answer in the form of a question, to a problem
raised by Hylas about the creation.
What would you have? Do I not acknowledge
a twofold state of things—the one ectypal
or natural, the other archetypal and
eternal? The former was created in time;
the latter existed from everlasting in the
mind of God.... Is any more than this necessary
in order to conceive the creation? "2
Here "creation" means only the "order of nature." The
archetypes are stable whereas the ectypes are fleeting.
The archetypes are the Divine Ideas; the ectypes, ideas
of sense. The archetypes have a continued existence in
the Divine mind which guarantees the reality of the ob-
jective world.
This may be connected with his thought in Siris
when he says:
1. D, 423-424
2. D, 475.

Sensible things are rather considered as
one than truly so, they being in a perpetual
flux or succession, ever differing and
various. Nevertheless all things together
may be considered as one universe (287, 288);
one by the connexion, relation and order of
its parts, which is the work of mind." 1
Berkeley now connects his two orders of existence with
ancient philosophers: "the flowing philosophers who held
all things to be in a perpetual flux, always generating
and never existing; and those others who maintained the
universe to be fixed and immovable.
"
2
The difference
lies in the fact that the former "considered things
sensible and natural", 3 "the latter the intelligible
world (293, 294, 295), abstracted from all sensible
things."^ Thus both views are equally true depending
upon one’s meaning: "if we mean by things the sensible
objects, these it is evident are always flowing; but if
we mean things purely intelligible
,
then we may say on
the other hand, with equal truth, they are unmovable and
unchangeable."5
In the next chapter, Berkeley's doctrine of
Archetypes will be connected with his view of the Creation.
Before leaving this discussion certain questions may be
raised: Are the archetypes Platonic Ideas? Are they
universals? Wild says "not only does he now explicitly
1. SIR, #347.
2. SIR, #348.
3. SIR, #348.
4. SIR, #348.
5. SIR., #349.
<.
1
.
.
•
*
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adopt a Platonic doctrine of eternal archetypes in the
Divine Mind, but his reasons for doing so clearly involve
a serious modification of his early position. n -L If the
latter statement is true it is in the direction of
greater coherence. But that doctrine of archetypes is
not correct. His view is not Platonic. Plato's eternal
Ideas are not in, but independent of the Divine Mind,
in the sense that they were not created by the Divine
Mind
.
Are the archetypes universals? Yes. The
particulars of sense experience refer to the universal
archetypes. These archetypes connect the particulars
of experience in such a way that knov/ledge can be said
to be about universal notions. 2
Since ideas are passive and inert and spirits
active, knowledge of spirits cannot logically be through
passive ideas* Berkeley calls the experience by which we
have knov/ledge of spirits (and relations), notions.
Knowledge of self is immediate and of other selves is
mediate by means of notions which are inferences from the
ideas their agency excites in the self, and by analogy
from oneself.
Knov/ledge of self is tested by mature reflection
in Siris and Berkeley finds the self or person "of all
1. Wild, GB, 169-170
2. P, Introd. #15.
*-
.
,
.
.
.
.
created things seeraeth alone indivisible, i.e. a unity.
It is the knowing self ' that relates, identifies and
experiences succession. It is a center which coherently
organizes the variety and continuity of ideas and notions.
Berkeley escapes subjectivism and solipsism by
his doctrine of eternal archetypes. These archetypes
bring greater coherence into Berkeley's system because
they are the referents of human ideas and as such account
for an objective system of nature which guarantees the
experience of a common world.
, .
.
.
.
.
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CHAPTER V
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
The coherence of Berkeley 1 s system is seen through
the relation which God has to his system. Thus the import-
ance of God to Berkeley's system can scarcely he over-
estimated. God is its mainspring and heart. He is spoken
of as the Governing Spirit, the Supreme Agent, the Author
of Nature, the Supreme Unlimited Agent, First Cause, etc.
But how did Berkeley arrive at this position? Was it an
assumption necessary to preserve his system? Is it as
Hegel said that "The inconsistency of this system God has
again to make good; He has to hear it all away; to Him the
solution of the contradiction is left." 1 Is there such
inconsistency? Upon what grounds did Berkeley assert the
existence of God?
1. Arguments for God's Existence
We shall begin to say that Berkeley was very sure
of the existence of God. "I am certain there is a God, tho
'
I do not perceive Him--have no intuition of Him. This is
not difficult if we rightly understand what is meant hy
certainty;" 2 (the kind of certainty here referred to is a
1. Hegel, LHP, III, 367
2 . CB
,
825
.

synthesis of experience.)
One of the less significant arguments for God is
drawn from Berkeley*s theory of vision used in Alciphron
.
Alciphron asks the question:
Do you pretend you can have the same
assurance of the being of a God that
you can have of mine, whom you actually
see stand before you and talk to you?
Euph. The very sane, if not greater.
Ale. How do you make this appear?
Euph. ...you grant that, in a strict sense, I
do not see Alciphron, i.e., that individual
thinking thing, but only such visible
signs and tokens as suggest and infer his
existence ...Even so, in the selfsame man-
ner... though I cannot with eyes of flesh
behold the invisible God, yet I do in the
strictest sense behold and perceive by all
my senses such signs and tokens...! do at
all times and in all places perceive
sensible signs which evince the being of
God
Euph. You have as much reason to think the
Universal Agent or God speaks to your
eyes, as you have for thinking any partie-
ular person speaks to your ears.^
As a matter of fact we not only know God as
truly and immediately as any other mind or spirit, except
ourselves, but far more evidently because the effects of
nature are infinitely more numerous. 5 "Everything we see,
hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense being a sign or
effect of the power of God.'*^ Nature is a sign which
1. ALC, IV, #5.
2. ALC, IV, #12.
3. P, #147.
4. P, #148.
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suggests the being and Nature of God. It is likewise an
effect of his agency.
Berkeley did not ground his theory of the existence
and nature of God on a dogmatic assertion but on a rigorous
analysis, and synthesis of experience. Berkeley would ob-
ject to those-*- who speak of his "assumption of Spirits".
In the Dialogues he objects to being classed with those
who assume God and infer or deduce from this assumption
the existence and relations of things. "I, on the other
side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of
God because all sensible things must be perceived of Him . "
^
Berkeley starts from the facts of experience and finds that
God is necessary to a coherent explanation.
In one paragraph^ in the Principles a summary is
made of three elements or facts which make it evident that
God exists and gives some proof of our knowledge.
1.
The works of nature or the ideas and sensa-
tions perceived by us are not dependent on the wills of
men. It is repugnant that they should subsist by them-
selves so must be some other cause that produces them.^
This is similar to a statement in the Dialogues that
because of the dependency of myself and my ideas, "I do,
by an act of reason necessarily infer the existence of
1. Hedenius, STBP, and others.
2. D, 424-425.
3. P, #146.
4. Cf. P, #29-33, 90; D, 446.
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God and of all created things in the mind of God."^ We
are not authors of our own sensations, ^ They are produced
by God. He does not know them as sensation but as pure
intellect. The fixed order of nature which secures the
constancy and truth of things is grounded in God.-
5
2.
There are certain qualities or characteristics
which evince the existence and nature of God such as regu-
larity, order, steadiness, coherence, magnificence, beauty,
perfection, "exact harmony and correspondence of the whole"
of creation along with laws, instincts, inclinations,
appetites and passions. 4 Prom the variety, order, and
manner of sense perceptions, "I conclude", says Berkeley,
"the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good beyond
comprehension." 5 This is the argument from design. That
which has design has coherence. It is the work of a mind.
It is not produced by finite minds. It must be the work
of God. God is the preserver of value and goodness.
5. In rational theology the import of the at-
tributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect
shows that they belong to the Spirit "who works all in
/»
all" and "by whom all things consist." 0
1. D, 448.
2. P, #56; Cf. CB, 850.
3. P, #28-42; SIR, #294-297, 300-318, 359-365.
4. P, #146, 30.
5. D, 428.
6. P, #146.
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Is our knowledge of God’s existence, workings, and
attributes mediate or immediate? The answer is both. God
is so great, omnipresent and so all encompassing that we
have immediate contact with him through ideas or nature but
our "reflexion and reasoning” make our knowledge mediate.
It is inferential reasoning from that which one apprehends
immediately and may be either from sense perception of from
a notion of oneself.
Berkeley owns that he does not have an idea
1
of
God unless one takes "idea” in a large sense or notion.
"Then by analogy my soul may be said to furnish me with.
.
.
an image or likeness of God,..., for all the notion I have
of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heighten-
ping its powers and removing its imperfections...” "We
imagine a great difference and distance in respect of
knowledge, power, etc., betwixt a man and a worm. The
like difference betwixt man and God may be imagined; or
infinitely greater difference."^
God is active thinking substance, efficient and
ultimate cause and ground of the universe;
4
He produces
and sustains all things; 0 He is "understanding as well as
will";^ since the things I perceive must have an existence,
1. CB, 795.
2 • D, 447.
3. P, #146.
4. P, #26-29
5. P, #94.
6. CB, 824.
l
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they or their archetypes, out of my mind; but being ideas,
neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than
in an understanding; there is therefore an understanding 1
in God*
As will. He is power; His will constitutes the
laws of nature and ideas are the Divine language. 2 He is
wise and good.
3
He is a Being of transcendent and un-
limited perfections. It is thus not to be expected that
finite spirits should have exactly just notions of Him,
His attributes and ways of operation.
4
Knowledge of God is mediate knowledge by way
of reflection and reasoning, grounded in immediate experi-
ence of sense perception and immediate self-know ledge
.
“Our knowledge of God is like sense-perception in its
cogency, like self-knowledge in its intimacy, like know-
ledge of other minds in the conscious reasoning involved.”0
2.
God as Cause.
Berkeley’s view of causality is that spirit alone
is active, spirit alone is cause, and the first, efficient,
and final cause of all things is the Eternal Mind or
Spirit. The whole realm of nature and its laws is dependent
upon the Divine Will. How does Berkeley come to this view?
1. D, 458.
2. P, #32, 53, 61-66, D, 457, NTV, #147.
3. P, #30-32.
4. D, 475.
5. Luce, BM, 121.
V!
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He begins with the immediately certain existence of objects
of sense* These ideas must have a cause* Such cause must
be either matter, another idea, or spirit. Matter does not
exist and so cannot be a cause, ideas are passive so cannot
be cause; thus the cause must be spirit. I know that I
am not cause of my own ideas so the ultimate cause must be
another Spirit, God.
It is not possible to have a distinct idea of
power, causality or agency (but one can have a notion of
them). uWe can only infer its presence from its effects." 1
"A little attention will make it plain to anyone, that to
have an idea which shall be like that active principle of
motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible." 2
Thus an agent or spirit cannot be perceived but only the
effects which the agent produces. Knowledge of causality
depends upon inference from experience. Thus it is not
derived as a given of sense experience but is a notion or
concept derived from inference or reasoning about sense
experience
•
i. Idea as Cause
Berkeley’s view of ideas as passive and of
agents as active, makes it impossible that ideas can
produce activity. In the Commonplace Book he says:
1. TVV, #11-12
2. P, #27.
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"One idea not the cause of another — one power not the
cause of another..." 1 If anyone should retain the old
way of thinking and call one idea the cause of another,
Berkeley claims that he will drive such a person "into
many ah surdity s .
"
2 In the Dialogues when Hylas tries to
establish an active element in sense perception, Philonous
shows that "this action cannot exist in, or belong to any
unthinking thing."
3
For all our ideas, sensations and
perceptions are inactive and there is no agency included
in them. "To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is
nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas."
It is impossible for an idea to do anything or be the cause
of anything. Berkeley* s system would be inconsistent and
incoherent if an "idea" could be cause, and since matter
does not exist it cannot be a cause. The argument, stated
briefly, follows: "I challenge you to shew me that thing
in nature which needs matter to explain or account for it."
5
That being utterly destitute of knowledge or will could
produce ideas or in any way affect intelligence, "this I
can never understand." 0
It would be entirely inconsistent to allow some-
thing inert, impotent, an unknown, devoid of all qualities,
1. CB, 450; Cf. D, 457.
2. CB, 862.
3. D, 406ff
• ; P, #25, 26.
4. P, #25.
5. D, 439.
6. D, 461; Cf. D, 431.
.*
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to produce either ideas or the universe of possible experi-
ence and knowledge. Matter cannot be the cause because it
does not exist. The so-called natural causes are merely
signs which foretell the appearance of their effects. Thus
"we must carefully distinguish betwix't two sorts of causes--
physical and spirituall. The former may more properly be
called occasions but to comply with common terminology we
may call them causes, "but then we must mean causes that do
nothing."
2
The relation of cause and effect is the same as
the relation of sign and the thing signified. But sense
experience does not give the cause and effect relation. One
must seek the true agent of which these are effects.
Thus since cause cannot be an idea, nor can it
be a combination of ideas. It must therefore be a substance.
There is no corporeal or material substance. "It remains
therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active
p
substance or Spirit." Is this spirit finite or infinite?
ii. Finite Agency
"There are no causes (properly speaking) but
spiritual, nothing active but Spirit."'5 Berkeley recognized
that his own experience of willing was the only agency he
or any one could know which could produce motion. Our in-
1. CB, 867-868.
2. P, #26.
3. CB, 862.
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ward consciousness of ourselves as a thinking being, ex-
ercising power over our bodies, producing motion, gives
us a concrete example of agency and cause. 1 H I have no
notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can
O
I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit."
One cannot know causality from ideas of sense but only
by notions.
Berkeley notes the agency of spirit in the
imagination when the mind seems to excite mental images
at will. He also recognizes a secondary causality in the
finite agency but the finite agent acts only within cer-
tain prescribed-by-the-infinite limits and conditions.
Berkeley speaking through Philonous says:
I have nowhere said that God is the only
agency who produces all the motions in
bodies. It is true I have denied there
are any other agents besides spirits;
but this is very consistent with allow-
ing to thinking rational beings, in the
production of motions, the use of limited
powers, ultimately derived from God but
immediately under the direction of their
own wills...
3
Conditions under which the finite agent must act
are thus seen to be ultimately derived from God. Finite
agency is relative.
.
SIR, 160-161.
. D, 457.
. D, 454.
1
2
3
.
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Berkeley moves from finite agency to the
infinite in the following reasoning:
The use of an instrument showeth the
agent to be limited by rules of another’s
prescription, and that he cannot obtain
his end but in such a way, and by such
conditions. Whence it seems a clear con-
sequence that the supreme unlimited Agent,
useth no tool or instrument at all. The
will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner
exerted than executed, without the applica-
tion of means; which if they are employed
by inferior agents, it is not upon account
of any real efficacy that is in them...
but merely in complicance with the laws of
nature, or those conditions prescribed
to them by the First Cause ... 1
From observation of his own experience and by
logical and analogical reasoning Berkeley asserts the
omnipotent God to be First Cause. To assert idea to be
cause when ideas are passive, is to assert a contradiction.
It would be incoherent to assert on the basis of sense
experience and reasoning that an inert, impotent, unknown
something could be the cause of anything when the only
active existence is spirit. Likewise to assert that
finite agency is responsible for all that is produced.
Is to assert something which the facts of experience
will not substantiate. Finite agency acts according to
laws of another’s prescription.
1. D, 433
.
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iii. God: First, Efficient and Final Cause
Berkeley’s analysis of experience led him to
ascribe the cause of sense ideas to the eternal Spirit,
for some spirit other than the human spirit created the
world of nature and sustains it. From the orderliness,
regularity, magnificence, etc., of the universe, we come
to have a notion of this One, Eternal Spirit. Is this
Spirit or God the First Cause?
Berkeley asserts that his view "excellently
corresponds with the creation"-^- recorded in Genesis, He
supposed none of those things to have existed before.
"The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation
of things, of real things" 2 ,fWhy may we not conceive it
possible for God to create things out of nothing? Cer-
tainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we
imagine. This is Berkeley the religionist speaking as
in a part of his answer to Lady Percival.
I beg you will inform Her Ladyship that
I do not deny the existence of any of
those sensible things which Moses said
were created by God: they existed from
all eternity in the Divine Intellect, and
then became perceptible (i.e., were created)
in the same manner and order as is described
in Genesis. For I take creation to belong
to things only as they respect finite
spirits, there being nothing new to God.
Hence it follows that the act of creation
consists in God’s willing that those things
should be perceptible to other spirits which
1. CB, 551
2. D, 471.
5. CB, 842

before were known only to Himself. Now
both reason and scripture assure us there
are other spirits (as angels of different
orders, etc.) besides man, who, ’tis pos-
sible might have perceived this visible
world according as it was successively
exhibited to their view before man’s
creation. Besides, for to agree with the
Mosaic account of the creation it is suffi-
cient if we suppose that a man, in case he
was then created and existing at the time
of the chaos, might have perceived all
things formed out of it in the very order
set down in Scripture which is no ways
repugnant to our principles.
But there is another contradictory element here
also when Berkeley states that sensible things “existed
from all eternity in the Divine Intellect and then became
perceptible (i.e., were created) in the same manner and
order as described in Genesis.” The eternal, archetypal
existence of sensible things was in the Divine Intellect
from eternity. This would mean that creation was only a
creation of finite spirits and a willing that the un-
created and eternal sensible things or their ectypes
should become perceptible to finite creatures.-3 In other
words things begin and end their existence only in relation
to finite creatures and not in relation to God. The whole
universe is the creation of a wise and good Agent, 2 but
not a creation out of nothing. This I believe to be
Berkeley’s view but this is not the only interpretation
of the Creation recorded in Genesis, The eternal archetype
1. D, 474. Cf. 60, 302
2. P, #107.

86
.
or Divine Ideas are in the mind of God, were not therefore
created, and one must conclude that they are in a sense
identical with the mind of God. If however, Berkeley
meant "in the mind of God" as "in relation to the mind of
God", then the Eternal Ideas were in a sense co-eternal
with God. The distinction is not clear in Sir is .-*- I
believe that the Eternal Ideas of Plato are equivalent to
the Divine Ideas of Berkeley except, (and this exception
is essential), that the former govern the activity and
creation of God from the outside and the latter’s Divine
Ideas are within God determining his creativity.
Berkeley’s attempt to deal with the creation in a coherent
way and yet allow the Scripture.1 account of the Creation to
stand involves him in contradiction and a double truth.
God is the efficient cause of things; he is "that
Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all
things."^ He is not an absentee creator who set the world
in motion as a clock, but he is a constant creator, "be-
tokening an immediate act of power and providence", "ever
shifting with the occasions". 5 Thus nature is the "Divine
Language" or as spoken of in Siris
.
"Rational Discourse."
But Berkeley's account of creation is involved
in further incoherence because he uses the concept of
1. SIR, #336-339.
2. P, #94.
3. ALC, IV #14; Cf. SIR, 233.

God's "producing” all things and also that they existed
uncreated from all eternity in the rnind of God. Is God
still producing or creating ideas? The ectypes or copies
known through sense experience are fleeting, changing.
Was creation then a willing that these become perceptible
and is God's producing, a making perceptible further
ectypes or copies of archetypes which existed eternally
in the mind of God? The answer is not readily discern-
able and involves Berkeley in incoherence.
In Siris ^ Berkeley considers the various physical
or mechanical explanations of nature. Laws of attraction
and repulsion or laws of motion are only rules or methods
of nature. They do not explain efficient or final causes,
however incoherent. Where intellect presides there will
be order and rule; there will be constancy. It is in-
coherent to suppose that the mechanical effects should
find any other explanation then that of a mind or spiritual
agent
The first, efficient and final cause is the
supreme Agent or God. There is a teleological element
which directs and conditions the whole for a good end.
The Beauty and usefulness of the several parts of creation
prove the workmanship of God.
1. SIR, #231-264
2. SIR, #234-237
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Instruments, occasions, signs occur in,
or rather make up, the whole visible
course of nature. These being no agents
themselves, are under the direction of
one agent, concerting all for one end,
the supreme good... This Divine Love and
Intellect are not themselves obvious to
our view, or otherwise discerned than in
their effects. Intellect enlightens.
Love connects, and the Sovereign God
attracts all things.-3
We are like men in Plato’s cave; our light is
dim and our situation bad. But if sense and sense experi
ence acquaint us with the course and analogy of natural
effects, thought, reason and intellect will introduce us
into knowledge of their causes. 2 Thus intellect and
reason are alone the sure guides to truth.
3. Berkeley’s view of Evil
Berkeley has been criticized on the ground that
he assumes the goodness of the world and disregards or at
least belittles the reality of evil.
"The slow and gradual methods observed in the
production of natural things...," "monsters, untimely
births, fruits blasted in the blossom..., miseries incident
to human life and the like," 0 do not appear to have as
their cause the immediate agency of an "Almighty Agent"
or a "Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness."
Berkeley asserts that these "methods of nature
1. SIR, #258-259; Cf. 160.
2. SIR, #263-264; Cf. D, 448.
3. P, #151, Cf. P, #62, 31.
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are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most
simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent
manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God...
To the unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more
plainly legible than the intimate presence of an all-wise
Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole
system of beings.
Berkeley considers this operation according to
general and stated laws so necessary that this considera-
tion "abundantly outbalances whatever particular incon-
veniences may thus arise."
2
He even states that these "blemishes and defects
of nature are not without their use" because they bring
variety and set off the beauty of the rest of' creation,^'
The waste we decry in nature need not concern us nor is it
a sign of weakness but of power because God csn by an act
of will produce everything. 4 It may be said that pain and
uneasiness are indispensably necessary to our well-being."
5
We take too limited a view of life and its pain. On the
other hand "we shall be forced to acknowledge that those
particular things, which considered in themselves, appear
to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as
linked with the whole system of beings." 5
1. P, #151; Cf. P, #62, 31.
2. P, #151; Cf. P, #62, 31.
3. P, #152.
4. P, #152.
5. P, #153.
6. P, #153.

This is essentially Berkeley’s view as found in
the Principles
,
Dialogues and elsewhere. In general it is
the view of an absolutist. It is an argument based on
human ignorance and even asserts that the evil is good or
promotes a good end. Berkeley here is not being empirical
but rather dogmatic. He is assuming the goodness of God
on the ground of already established religious beliefs,
not on the ground of an analysis of experience. This
departs from Berkeley’s method of dealing with the facts
of experience and from these facts finding a coherent
harmony by the application of the coherence criterion.
4. Epistemological Monism or Dualism?
Having dealt with Berkeley's treatment of know-
ledge of nature, self, other selves and God, the question
may be raised: Was Berkeley a monist or dualist in
epistemology? These terms are defined by Ledger Wood in
Runes-1- as follows:
Epistemological monism: Theory that Z&7
non-inferential knowledge
. . .
the object
of knowledge .. .is numerically identical
with the data of knowledge. Epistemo-
logical dualism is the theory that in
perception, memory and other types of non-
inferential cognition, there is a numerical
duality of the content or datum immediately
present to the knowing mind.., end the real
object known... 1
It is generally agreed, judging by the evidence
1. Runes, DOP
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in Berkeley's works that he was a dualist in his know-
ledge of other minds and relations. Knowledge of other
minds is a mediate knowledge and in the case of other
finite minds is an inference from the ideas excited in
me hy their activity and also by analogy from the experi-
ence or notion which I have of my own mind. The know-
ledge which I have of the Divine mind is an inference from
the order and coherence of ideas and a heightened analogy
to oneself. This is clearly an indication of epistemological
dualism.
With reference to objects of sense, ideas, or
nature, Berkeley is usually, if not always called a monist.
His denial of matter and his assertion that the idea is
the real thing and the real thing idea, are the grounds for
this assertion. It is true that the immediate apprehension
of an idea is monistic, but there is usually, if not al-
ways, a dualistic reference when it functions in knov/ledge
of nature. Thus, it may be asserted that Berkeley is a
dualist even in knowledge of ideas on the following
grounds
:
1. Berkeley’s acknowledgment of two orders of
existence, the one archetypal and eternal; the other,
ectypal and natural 1 suggests a copy theory of knowing.
No two spirits have the same idea, they have only their
own which makes it possible for two or more persons to
1. Cf. Section on Archetypes, Chapter V.
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apprehend the same object at the same time.
2. Berkeley’s use of the term "in the mind"
means in relation to mind or that the mind comprehends
ideas. "When I speak of objects as existing in the mind,
or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in
the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist
in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My
meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives
them; and that it is affected from without, or by some
being distinct from itself.""
1
* The being or object then
is distinct from the comprehension or the object in the
mind.
If this view be considered further it will be
seen that it explains the assertion in Chapter III in
connection with an atomistic or organic view of truth
that he who knows more of the connection of ideas has
more of truth. The archetype is the object of all pos-
sible ideas that are related in it. Then ideas are only
appearances as Berkeley asserts in Siris and the truth is
to be found by exhausting all possible ideas of the object
in their relations one to another. This is a copy theory.
The archetype and the sense idea are both ideas. But the
sense idea is an idea which copies the archetype idea.
1. D, 470

Berkeley does not develop this because his
doctrine of archetypes, although implicit at an early
period, is not developed until later; and also because
of his objection to using the term archetype since it
might connote the meaning of external-to-all-minds which
is not Berkeley’s meaning. Thus there is some evidence
in Berkeley's thought of epistemological dualism.
Knowledge of God is an inference from the ideas
of sense and notions of the connection of ideas as well
as by a heightened analogy. Nature is the Divine Language.
It is an orderly and coherent system. There is evidence of
coherent design in nature. This is not known by sense
experience alone but by an inference from the connection
and relatedness of reality. Thus not sense experience,
nor intuition, nor even practical results is criterion;
but a coherent view of the system of reality is Berkeley's
criterion of the truth.
.t
.
.
.
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CHAPTER VI
TEE SCIENCES: PSYCHOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS
1. Vision and Spatial Extension
Berkeley's New Theory of Vision (1709) is a
psychological analysis of soace or the relation of
visual to tactual experience. He concludes that the
proper objects of sight are light and color
1
which have
a dependence upon the perceiving mind for their exist-
ence, and that distance, magnitude, and situation are
not objects of sight but are suggested to the understand-
ing and discovered through experience. The criterion of
truth which Berkeley uses most extensively to test the
truth of the given is sensation, but not wholly that.
He makes some use of "general consent" in the
beginning of this Essay , when he acknowledges two agree-
ments. (1) "That Distance, of itself and immediately,
O
cannot be seen" because distance is a line endwise from
the eye end therefore remains one point whether the dis-
tance is long or short; and (2), that "the estimate we
make of the distance of objects considerably remote is
rather an act of judgment grounded on experience than of
sense. Berkeley makes no further attempt to prove the
former beyond the statement but extends the latter to
include objects near at hand. It was generally believed
1. NTV, #129; Cf. 43, 103
2 . NTV, #2
.
3 . NTV, #3 .
,T
•
.
-
.
.
*
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that the distance of near objects could he determined
by a natural geometry of the eye.^ In the Commonplace
Book he says
:
The common errour of the opticians, that
we judge of distance by angles, strengthens
men in their prejudice that they see things
without and distant from the mind.--
In this case, Berkeley rejects a generally accepted belief
on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the judgment
>
1
of the distance of remote objects and also because of
three other reasons: (1) that the lines and angles "are
themselves not perceived... I appeal to anyone’s experi-
ence...
MO (2) It is a mere hypothesis and has no real
existence corresponding to it in nature;^ (3) Even if
perception of these lines and angles were possible, it
would not be a sufficient or adequate explanation of the
phenomena of distance. ^ Berkeley employs the criterion
of sense experience but it is not 8 complete or sufficient
test, e.g. it could not account for visual hallucination.
It provides the data, and is a test of its givenness, or
that one has such an idea. However, the testing of the
logical consistency and the appeal to experience (pragmatic),
plus the attempt to find a coherent and adequate explanation
is an appeal to the principle of reason, of judgment based
on experience, or a use of the coherence criterion.
1. NTV, #4.
2. GB, 609.
3. NTV, #12.
4. NTV, #14.
5. NTV, #15.
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Berkeley now goes into a lengthy proof that the
estimate of distance, of near, as well as remote objects,
is an act of judgment based on experience and not a
judgment of sense of sight* This is true also of situation
and magnitude.
1
What seems to be given in sight is not
given at all. What then is the source of this judgment?
Berkeley turns to tactual experience and attempts to find
ideas common to both senses. He finds that in touch the
objects are given more permanently and reliably but the
ideas of sight and of touch are not identical. We cannot
see and touch the same object, and whereas visible objects
become real only through percipient mind, the suggestion is
allowed to stand that tactual and locomotive objects are
2
external or absolute because they are more firm and steady.
This is inconsistent with Berkeley's position in the
Principles and exposes the Essay to the charge of inco-
herence. Realizing that the charge might be made,
Berkeley in the Principles defends himself by saying that
a denial of the external-to-mind or absolute existence of
tactual objects was not necessary M for establishing the
notion there laid down." 5 Certainly the position in the
Principles is more consistent with a view of the whole of
his system, and is his view of space in his last work
Siris
•
1. NTV, #52-120
2. NTV, #77, 94
3. P, #44.
.-
>
Concerning absolute space, that phantom of
the mechanic and geometrical philosophers,
it may suffice to observe that it is
neither perceived by any sense, nor proved
by any reason...-
The only space which is recognized as valid is that in
relation to percipient mind, an acquired association of
sight and touch. The truth of Berkeley's position is
demonstrated by reason; i.e. removing of inconsistency
and a consideration of empirical evidence, using the
logic of induction and deduction, of involvement and
implication. In order for Berkeley’s treatment to be
more coherent, one could wish for more synthesis and
system, but this was not necessarily the problem of the
Essay . Berkeley does suggest, however, that from
The wonderful art and contrivance where-
with it /Fhe visive faculty/ is adjusted
to those ends and purposes for which it
was apparently designed; the vast extent,
number, and variety of objects that are...
suggested by it--all these...may, if any-
thing, give us some glimmering analogous
praenotion of things, that are placed
beyond the certain discovery and com-
prehension of our present state.
This takes one beyond a theory of vision into a theory
of reality and was beside the point of his inquiry.
It may be objected thst our inquiry has com-
pletely neglected the criterion of practical consequence
which it is an important one for Berkeley, especially in
this work. One cannot but be impressed by Berkeley's
1. SIR, #271
2. NTV, #148
..
method which is largely pragmatic in that he appeals to
that which can he verified in experience. Thus he appeals
to "any man's experience"^, to the fact that as proof
"anyone that pleases may easily satisfy himself by ex-
periment",^ along with countless references to the ex-
periments of others0 and his own consideration of the
Molyneux problem^ and its verification in real life.^
In addition, a summary paragraph connects Berkeley’s
theory of vision with practical life as follows:
The proper objects of Vision constitute the
Universal Language of Nature; whereby we
are instructed how to regulate our actions,
in order to attain those things that are
necessary to the preservation and well-
being of our bodies... It is by their
information that we are principally guided
in all the transactions and concerns of
life. 6
Berkeley tested the claims of his New Theory
of Vision in experience, i.e. experiment, ordinary sense
experience and introspective analysis. He uses what he
calls a common sense approach and speaks as though it were
the easiest thing to do, which it is not. It is rather
one of the hardest, most painstaking exercises which the
mind performs. The test of truth is pragmatic in that
one is thereby instructed how to govern one’s life to
1. NTV, #43.
2. NTV, #31.
3. NTV, #29, 34-39, 40, 49, 79,
4. NTV, #40-42, 79, 92-99, 103,
27, 32, 49, 53, 59, etc.
5. Fraser, W, I, 210.
6. NTV, #147.
89, 127-134, etc.
106, 132-137, etc. Cf. CB,
.
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attain its satisfactions. Let it be remembered also that
the objects of vision constitute the universal Language
of the Author of Nature and that nature is part of a
larger whole and pragmatism is not adequate here.
ii. Mathematics
The Commonplace Book -*- gives ample evidence of
Berkeley's early interest in mathematics. He was in his
college years carried along by a great general interest
in mathematics because of the discoveries of the "The
principle of indivisibles" by Cavalieri, the analytical
research of Descartes, the "New Mathematics" of Wallis,
the binomial theorem of Newton, and the fluxional or
differential calculus of Newton and Leibniz. In many
ways the "New Mathematics" was making for the advancement
of science and no philosopher could overlook its import-
ance .
2
Mathematics was "the darling of the age"; but
Berkeley saw its limitations.
The Schoolmen have noble subjects tut
handle them ill. The Mathematicians
have trifling subjects but reason
admirably about them. 3
Mathematics is purely a matter of signs and definitions
but is nevertheless useful4 for deductive reasoning.
1. CB, 56, 164, 165, 324, 328, 331, 339, 346, 358, 389-391,
393, 397, 402, 410, 467, 494, 529-532, 642, 709, 763,
849, 865, 880, 929, 930, 936, 937, 939, 940.
2. CB, 324.
3. CB, 405.
4. CB, 865.
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Berkeley attempted to aoply mathematical conceptions to
ethics, founding an "Algebra of Ethics", and to nature,
as an "Algebra of Nature" or causality,
Berkeley soon came to realize that his "new
principle" involved difficulties with regard to the new
mathematics.^ A line for Berkeley was composed of "minima
sensibilia" or the minutest possible objects of sense;
it is impossible that these should be divisible for then
we would have something of which our senses would not
make us aware. Sensation is the test of all geometrical
relations and it follows that the only pure science is
algebra. Berkeley clearly perceived that it followed from
his principle that much of the traditional Euclidean
geometry must be rejected, which was a very radical position
to take.
If infinitesimals were admitted to exist, the
significance of Berkeley’s "minima sensibilia" would
disappear and the foundations’ of his philosophy would be
shaken. Thus in the Commonplace Book , the Analyst and
his other mathematical writings, Berkeley branded the
infinitesimals of Leibniz
2
and the fluxions of Newton as
involving an ultimate contradiction in their nature, if
they are viewed as things and as perceivable by sense
impressions. In addition Newton is opposed by Berkeley
1. P, #130 ff; Analyst.
2. CB, 345.
3. P, #132* Cf. Analyst and the Defence of Free-thinking
in Mathematics.

because he says "colour is in the subtil matter"^ and
because he allows both absolute motion and relative
motion2 ; absolute space and relative space.'-' In De Motu ,
Berkeley examines the characteristics of the knowledge
of absolute space and concludes that absolute space is
in nowise knowable
.
Berkeley’s treatment of mathematics shows that
he regarded the analytic and abstractly consistent
separation of form from content in mathematical method
and reasoning as meaningless. The empirical and pragmatic
grounding of mathematics must related to a view of reality
as a whole. The Analyst is an essential criticism of the
pragmatic view of mathematics which has presupposed a
fixed conception of the principle of utility. Everything
which one now considers useful may not be useful at all.
In every other science men prove their
conclusions by their principles, and not
their principles by their conclusions.
But if in yours /T.e., mathematics'/ you
should allow yourselves this unnatural
way of proceeding, the consequence would
be that you must take up with Induction
and bid adieu to Demonstration.^
This is to acknowledge defeat as far as an exact science
is concerned. It follows that if mathematics is to be
meaningful it must be precise in its meaning as connected
with an object
.
1. CB, 932.
2. CB, 30.
3. CB, 98.
4. Fraser, III, Analyst, 30.

Berkeley* s treatment of mathematics recognizes
the force of mathematical demonstration hut he objects
to the mathematicians claim to certainty in the sciences,
unless mathematical reasoning is grounded in experience.
Furthermore he discovers that the principle of utility
is no fixed guide, for what one person considers useful,
may not be useful at all. Thus it is essential that one
have a precise meaning or objective reference connected
with basic principles in mathematical reasoning and
finally one must apply the criterion of coherence to
discover the meaning of meaning, the meaning of the
whole. It was Berkeley* s application of the coherence
criterion that made him critical of the mathematicians
and natural scientists of his day. What is the object
of mathematics? And of what do we assert mathematical
demonstrations to be true? The answer involves a
metaphysics.
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CHAPTER VII
CRITERION OF MORAL TRUTH
Berkeley’s ethical theory did not receive a
complete treatment in any one of his published works al-
though the Commonplace Book records that this was
Berkeley's intention as follows: "the 2 great Principles
of morality --the Being of God & the Freedom of Man. Those
to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book” . ^
This reference to the "Second Book" refers to Berkeley's
intention to deal with ethics in the second part of the
Principles, of Human Knowledge . The manuscript, however,
was lost during Berkeley's travels in Italy and he lacked
a desire to rewrite this work. Certain other of his works
partially make up for this omission. The most significant
are the Commonplace Book
,
Passive Obedience , and Alciphron .
I shall trace now the general development of
Berkeley's ethical views, indicating to what extent any
changes in his views were in the direction of improvement;
his use of criteria will be emphasized.
1. General Development of Berkeley's Ethics
i • The Commonplace Book
In the Commonplace Book , Berkeley mentions
"morality" as one of three kinds of useful knowledge, 2
1, CB, 511
2. CB, 865
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and "moral" as one of three kinds of truth. ^ In the
Principles he indicated that if his new Principle be
applied to morality "errors of dangerous consequence ...
may be cleared and truth appear plain, uniform and con-
sistent".^ This was probably done in the lost manuscript.
He says "we have no ideas of virtues or vices, no ideas
of moral actions".^ This follows from an application of
his Principle. The Commonplace Book also records that
Berkeley considered formulation of an algebra of Ethics.
He hoped that the same method, the same kind of demonstra-
tion that was used in mathematics might be used in ethics.
He says "morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics"^
and that "to demonstrate morality it seems one need only
make a dictionary of words, and see which included which".
5
If the meaning of ethical terms or propositions were set-
tled one might use these terms as one uses terms in mathe-
matics and by logical deduction arrive at truth in ethics.
In Berkeley* s discussion of moral questions in his other
works we shall note to what extent he follows this method.
Before doing this, it may be noted that: (1)
Berkeley takes freedom for granted. 5 The morality of an
action depends on the will and one has sufficient freedom
1. CB, 687.
2. P, #144.
3. CB, 679.
4. CB, 768.
5. CB, 702.
6. CB, 158. Cf. 164.
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to entitle him to all the guilt of his actions.- Thus
persons are responsible. (2) "Sensual pleasure is the
summum bonum" This statement is qualified by a fur-
ther statement, that "sensual pleasure, ..., is good and
desirable by a wise man".^ Berkeley did not however,
continue seriously to regard sense experience or sensual
pleasure as the essence or criterion of the highest good,
for we shall note later, in the Alciphron , pleasures of
sense are the lowest in the scale of pleasure.
ii • Passive Obedience
Passive Obedience
,
1712, which is a discourse
on the ethics of civil government, provides a further in-
sight into Berkeley* s ethical theory. At the outset one
is impressed by the inclusiveness of his method if not by
the thesis which he will attempt to prove. He intends to
prove that there is a "passive obedience" due the supreme
civil power in any nation, on the grounds that "Loyalty
is a virtue or moral duty, and Disloyalty or Rebellion...
a vice or crime against the law of nature”.- Berkeley
makes a twofold distinction of the law of nature; 5 the one
signifies any general rule observed in the works of nature,
independent of the wills of men and the other refers to
"a rule or precept for the direction of voluntary actions
1. D, 454.
2. CB, 782.
3. GB, 786.
4. PO, #26.
5. PO, #33.
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of reasonable agents". The former describes phenomena,
is not moral, and may be broken, but the latter may not.
Since our bodies are a part of nature, they are subject
to its basic laws and instinctive demands but these do
not constitute a moral situation. 1 Moral worth consists
in the conformity of our actions with the moral laws or
principles recognizable by all rational agents, and must
be obeyed no matter what the consequences may be in a
particular case. One should not regard private interest,
love of friends, or the public good, if they seem contrary
to rational moral principles, "though thereby he should
bring himself to poverty, death or disgrace: no, though
he should involve his family, his friends, his country..."
2
/
This is a clear statement of an ethics of
principle but it is also true that moral principles are
justified on general grounds of utility. This raises the
whole question of (1) whether God created the laws of
reason on the ground of his goodness, the various moral
laws being deductions from His nature, who wills the good
of all his creatures, 5 or (2) whether the "rules of reason"
are eternal, binding on God as well as man with God, in
order to be rational, willing the good, and various moral
lav/s discoverable by means of rational deduction,^ resulting
1. P0, #35.
2. P0, #13.
3. P0, #7.
4. P0, #12.
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usually in the universal good. This second position seems
to be Berkeley's position when he wrote Passive Obedience .
Let it be observed that nothing is a law
merely because it conduce th to the public
good, but because it is decreed by the
will of God, which alone can give the
sanction of a law of nature to any precept,
neither is any thing, how expedient or
plausible soever, to be esteemed lawful on
any other account than its being coincident
with, or not repugnant to, the laws promul-
gated by the voi, e of nature and reason. It
must indeed be allowed that the rational
deduction of those laws is founded in the
intrinsic tendency they have to promote the
well-being of mankind, on condition they
are universally and constantly observed.
But, though it afterwards comes to pass
that they accidentally fail of that end,
or even promote the contrary; they are
nevertheless binding# ••
Accordingly reason rather than utility is the supreme
principle. wWe must not be directed .. .by any emotions
in our blood and spirits but by the dictates of sober
and impartial reason”.
2
Since God is rational and wills the welfare
and happiness of his creatures, certain utilitarian moral
principles may be justified by deduction from that which
has a necessary connection with universal well being.
Truth, righteousness and chastity have such a necessary
connection. ^ Because of the necessity of rational con-
sistency, Berkeley now finds it necessary to assert that
a negative statement of principles will save one from the
1. PO, #31
2. PO, #21
3. PO, #15
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the conflict involved in positive statements.
1
This leads
to a negative morality, of not acting at all in order to
avoid conflict and inconsistency. Is this real morality?
Berkeley* s negative morality is an attempt to
establish rules which are logically necessary and which
will be recognized by all persons who attempt to get an
"enlarged view of things". With such a view, "it is not
possible there should be so great, if any, disagreement
at all amongst candid rational inquirers after truth".
^
In the proof of his universal moral rules
Berkeley stated that he intended "not to build on the
Authority of Holy Scripture, but altogether on the Princi-
ples of Reason common to all mankind".^ He appealed to
the general assent of all wise men, "that there are cer-
tain moral rules or laws of nature which carry with them
an eternal an indispensable obligation . But he re-
jected "universal agreement and consent of nations",
"Authority of learned men", innate ideas and "Divine
Ideas" in favor of deductive or mathematical reason for
the discovery of these laws. Therefore Deductive reason,
not authority, not universal agreement (unless it be that
of all wise men), not innate or Divine Ideas, is the
criterion of true moral rules or laws of nature.
1. PO, #13.
2. PO, #29.
3. PO, #2.
4. PO, #4.
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iii. Alciphron
Alciphron is a polemic in the form of dialogues
against the freethinkers or minute philosophers of
Berkeley’s time. Some of the dialogues deal with the
problems of morality. In them Berkeley seems to have
given up the idea of an algebra of ethics, or a system
of absolute ethics based on logical demonstration.
The first dialogue is introductory and allows
the minute philosopher, Alciphron to express his love of
reason, and describe truth of a M s table, permanent, and
uniform nature” Alciphron’
s
rejection of various
articles of religious faith is accomplished on the grounds
that there is great difference of opinion in religion,
not all of these opinions can be true, therefore none of
them are. But by this reasoning the freethinker's views
are also eliminated.
Alciphron' s esteem of the natural defined as
p
that which is original, universal and invariable, is
disproved by Euphranor. Rather whatever is agreeable to
reason is agreeable to the nature of man, and if there are
various opinions about the same thing, that one which is
grounded on clear and evident reasons is thought to be
true . 5
1. ALC, I, #8.
2. ALC, I, #12; Cf. #9
3. ALC, I, #13-15.
..
•
•
110
Euphranor further argues on the grounds of
Alciphron’s respect for design in nature that we ought
"to infer the same union, order, and regularity in the
moral world". Each individuals happiness is seen to he
connected with that of all others, end the happiness of
mankind is a greater good than that of any one man.^-
Eurphranor then suggests that the belief in God, immortality
and moral duties are wise, right, snd genuine principles of
human conduct if it can be shown that they have a necessary
2
connection with the well being of mankind.
The dialogue ends on this note with Alciphron
unwilling to admit this necessary connection.
The second dialogue is Berkeley’s criticism of
Mandeville’s thesis that private vices are public benefits.
In this dialogue Berkeley is critical rather than dogmatic.
He encourages Lysicles (speaking as Mandeville) to state
his position, thus exposing its absurdities. Virtue is not
the useful but a trick of statesmen, he admits; it is also
the following of natural instinct. "As other animals are
guided by natural instinct, man too ought to follow the
dictates of sense and appetite".^ Euphranor reminds
Lysicles that man has other higher faculties, "is it not
reasonable to think the operation of the highest and
noblest faculty to be attended with the highest pleasure?...
1. ALC, I, #16.
2. ALC, I, #16.
3. ALC, II, #11.
4. ALC, II, #14.

Ill
Reason# therefore, being the principal part of our
nature, whatever is most reasonable should seem most
natural to man”
Natural instincts and inclinations, drives and
instincts can not be valid criteria of truth in morality.
Sense is really "the lowest part or faculty of the human
soul” There follows a more detailed consideration of
hedonism. When Lysicles asks Euphyro to consult his own
feeling and experience, the latter replies: "Why then
it should seem that sensual pleasure is but a short
deliverance from a long pain" Future pleasures and
pleasures of the understanding are not to be judged by
actual sense.
To make a right computation should you not
consider all the faculties, and all kinds of
pleasure, taking into your account tnc
future as well as the present, and rating
them according to their true value?
4
This goes far beyond hedonism. The criterion of true
pleasure is not sense or practise but empirical coherence.
This evaluation of experience by using all of the facul-
ties, or this judging of value on the basis of true value,
includes the tests of sense and practical experience and
goes beyond by relating past, present and future pleasures
and judges them by a qualitative standard. It is the
coherence of all experience.
1 . ALC, II, #14.
2. ALC, Ilf #14.
3. ALC, Ilf #16.
4. ALC, Ilf #18.

In order to make a true estimate of
pleasure •• .we ought to compute in-
tellectual pleasures and future pleas-
ures, as well as present and sensible;
we ought to make allowances, in the
valuation of each particular pleasure,
for all the pains and evils, for all
the disgust, remorse, shame, that at-
tend it; we ought to regard both kind
and quality, the sincerity, the in-
tenseness, and the duration of pleas*
ures
.
In an addition to the second edition there is the thought
expressed that there may be more pleasure in prospect or
anticipation than in actual sensation.
This dialogue has in it more of contrast and
comparison than the others. It has references to Roman
history,^ Greek philosophy, 0 fables, 4 and events and
experiences of the times. Ethical truth is more than
formal consistency. Berkeley seeks to discover truth
rather from experience and in relation to value or the
general good of mankind.
In the third dialogue, Shaftesbury 5 is the butt
of Berkeley* s polemic in the character Alciphron. The
dialogue begins with Alciphron* s attempt to define "honour"
and establish its relation to virtue. "Honour", he says,
"is a noble unpolluted source of virtue, without the least
mixture of fear, interest, or superstition. It hath all
ALC, II, #18.
ALC
,
II, #7.
ALC, II, #16.
ALC, II, .toCO•>00<—
1
Cf
.
Wild
, GB.
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the advantages without the evils which attend religion".-*-
Crito is very outspoken against this use of the term
"honour". As a principle distinct "from conscience,
religion, reason, and virtue
,
it is no more than an
empty name, "no better than a meteor or painted cloud". 0
Whatever there is of virtue in "your men of fashion" is
probably due to custom or early training or conscience.
Alciphron believes that the notions of God and
of future states and rewards may scare some persons but
will never produce true virtue.
To go to the bottom of things, to analyze
virtue into its first principles .. .you
must understand that there is an Idea of
Beauty natural to the mind of man. This
all men desire... for its own sake, purely
from an instinct of nature.
4
It is felt by a peculiar moral sense and is
rather to be felt than explained or understood. ^ This
moral sense is original, unpremeditated, and genuine.^
It has a rapturous quality in virtue for virtue 1 s sake.
Euphranor agrees that there is a "beauty of
mind, a charm in virtue, a symmetry and proportion in the
moral world", 7 but it is every man* s true interest to be
1. ALC, III, #1.
2. ALC, III, #2.
3. ALC, III, #2.
4. ALC, III, #3.
5. ALC, III, #5; 1.
6. ALC, III, #6.
7. ALC, III, #4.
• )
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led by
reason and judgment balancing low and
sensual pleasures with those of a higher
kind, comparing present losses with future
gains, and the uneasiness and disgust of
every vice with the delightful practice
of the opposite virtue,
1
How can beauty be found in a system formed and connected
by chance or fate? "Without thought there can be no end
or design, and without an end there can be no use and
without use there can be no aptitude or fitness or
proportion from which beauty springs ,f .~
There are elements in Shaftesbury's ethics
which are similar to Berkeley's former position, e.g.
the ethics of principle, of virtue for virtue's sake.
Berkeley now, however, has become far more empirical#
His logic is still that of deduction from premises, but
in addition, moral truth is to be discovered through all
that is involved in experience. Beauty, system, design,
end, use, fitness, all express the fact that it is not
blind chance that can be credited as cause. To act upon
virtuous principles without some faith in their ultimate
meaning is irrational, indeed impossible. Berkeley's
thought has moved beyond the deductions which are pos-
sible on the basis of accepted postulates. Moral action
is concerned with ideal norms or standards of value.
Morality is involved with relition, faith in God.
1. ALC, III, #5.
2. ALC, III, #10
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2. Berkeley’s Use of Criteria
The general trend of Berkeley’s ethics is now
seen to he in the direction of a more coherent analysis
and synthesis of the problems involved. His desire to
demonstrate a system of ethics which would provide
absolute, fixed, eternal moral rules was seen to be
impossible. No proof was attempted which would demon-
strate the logical necessity of goodness from rationality
because none was possible. Berkeley’s thought and logic
moves in the direction of including more than what can be
deduced from accepted postulates, he becomes more empirical;
he is more appreciative of the problems involved.
One cannot but wish, however, that Berkeley had
given more serious consideration to the problems of human
freedom and that he had attempted to formulate certain
definite principles which might then serve as guides in the
making of moral laws or in the facing of moral situations.
In Passive Obedience
,
he practically denies to the common
person that ability or right to judge any question .
^
In
Alciphron , one might wish for a more comprehensive con-
sideration of values. Hedonism is limited and his
associations far from the ideal in morality.
What is Berkeley’s criterion of moral truth? As
has already been indicated, he rejects the authority of
1. PO, #19
.5
-
'
,
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Scripture, innate ideas. Divine Ideas, general consent,
instinct, custom, emotion or feeling and sense experience
as criteria. He uses utility or practical consequences
and coherence. The latter interpreted first of all, in
the narrow sense of logical consistency or implication
and later in the broader sense of a synthesis of all that
is involved in experience. Do these criteria exclude one
another? The answer is obviously "no". They are com-
plementary. They combine experience and reason. As seen
in Passive Obedience especially, the formal consistency
of deductive reason is of paramount importance; but the
test of consequences operates also.
Experience informs us that present good is
afterwards often attended with a greater
evil.. .Hence an alteration is wrought in
our judgments; we no longer comply with
the first solicitations of sense, but stay
to consider the remote consequences of an
action.
However, "the best man for want of judgment and
wisest for want of knowing all the hidden circumstances
and consequences of an action" 0 may be at a loss concern-
ing that which will promote the well-being of mankind.
In addition, there could be no sure standard based in a
persons private disinterested opinion. Something more
certain and permanent is needed.
It is "evident by the light of nature that there is
1. PO, #2
2. PO, #5
3. PO, #9
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a sovereign omnipotent Spirit...; it plainly follows
th8t a conformity to His will... is the sole rule whereby
every man who acts up to the principles of reason must
govern and square his actions .. .the same conclusion doth
likewise evidently result from the relation which God
bears to his creatures .. . f'^
A synthesis is effected by man through using
either approach, and following it out to that which is
involved. Concurrence in the end God requires, depends
upon "the observation of certain fixed, universal,
determinate rules or moral precepts, which in their own
nature have a necessary tendency to promote the well-
being of the sum of mankind, taking in all nations and
ages, . .
.
2
Upon an equal comprehensive survey of the
general nature, the passions, interests,
and mutual aspects of mankind, whatsoever
practical proposition doth to right reason
evidently appear to have a necessary con-
nexion with the universal well-being in-
cluded in it, is to be looked on as en-
joined by the will of God."’
In the Alciphron , Berkeley’s method is more
empirical and inclusive, as is the scope of his knowledge
of competing ethical doctrines. He rejects sense ex-
perience or sensual pleasure as criterion. Man has higher
faculties. Berkeley’s test is pragmatic in that he con-
siders practical consequences, but his emphasis on logical
1. PO, #6.
2 . PO, #10
3. PO, #11

consistency and consideration of the whole of experience,
and his interpretation of the meaning of the whole, show
that Berkeley’s criterion is coherence. His concept of
morality is unified and comprehensive. His rejection of
sensual pleasure as the highest good, of "honour'' as
source of virtue and his reiteration of the necessity of
the connection of morality with value, religion and the
nature of the whole indicate that Berkeley’s intention and
efforts were directed to establish a coherent view of
morality in its interrelation with the nature of reality
as a whole.
Berkeley’s moral philosophy indicates a change
in doctrine, method, and criterion. In the Passive Obedience
intended to prove a system of universal moral lav/s by the
deductions of reason, he rejects the “Authority of Holy
Scripture", "Authority of learned men", universal agreement
and consent of nations, innate ideas and Divine Ideas, in
favor of deductive or even mathematical reason in the
discovery and proof of moral laws. Here implication is
primary and involvement becomes negligible. This results
in a negative morality and the attempt is abandoned in
his later work.
In Alciphron
,
Berkeley’s method becomes more
empirical and comprehensive as Berkeley carries on the
dialogue with the free-thinkers; the scope of his know-
..
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ledge of competing ethical doctrine widens. Difference of
opinion in morality is not an argument against the pos-
sibility of moral laws. If true, the free thinkers opinions
are likewise subject to rejection.
Sensual pleasure as the highest good and "honour"
as the source of virtue are shown to give way to the common
good of mankind designed by God and a consistent and
coherent judgment of what is involved in moral experience.
Concurrence in the ends God requires, which ends have a
tendency to promote the common good, is to be discovered
in an analysis and synthesis of moral experience. Questions
of value, religion and the relation of morality to the universe
as a whole indicates that Berkeley's predominant criterion is
not practice but coherence.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE CRITERION OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH
Berkeley's treatment of revealed religion shows
a typical Tory Churchman's attitude which is hardly ade-
quate for philosophy. In revealed theology Berkeley
evinces a double truth. He would urge a legitimate
demonstration of religious truth if we do not go beyond
our ideas; "but to pretend to demonstrate or reason any-
thing about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit
faith becomes us. 1 ' 1 In matters of Reason and Philosophy,
Berkeley would reject all propositions whose meaning he
did not fully understand; but not in revelation. He con-
siders it irrational "to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and
ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things
that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach."
2
Furthermore he appears to discountenance and dis-
courage novelties, innovations, and new ideas in government
and religion. He says:
That innovations in government and religion
are dangerous and ought to be discountenanced,
I freely own. But is there the like reason
why they should be discouraged in philosophy?'5
The implication is plain. "Do not disturb" certain things
in revealed religion.^ His treatment of creation^ is one
1. CB, 590.
2 . CB, 732 .
3. D, 462.
4. The Bible.
5. Cf. Lady Percival Letter.
J
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example of this, as the ansv/er to Lady Percival's letter
makes plain. 4- "Consideration of God and our Duty" should
have first place in our studies. "The salutary truths of
the Gospel, which to know and to practice in the highest
perfection of human nature,"^ should he the chief employ-
ment of learned men.
A doctrine of a double truth in revealed religion
is the only adequate and reasonable description of Berkeley’s
statements . This would be true especially of his early
writings. Later he seeks to prove the reasonableness and
usefulness of religion, meaning Christianity. "There is
no need to depart from the received rules of reasoning to
justify the belief of Christians."^ This is true with but
few exceptions. One may be noted in Alciphron :
The being of God is capable of clear proof,
and a proper object of human reason: whereas
the mysteries of His nature, and indeed
whatever there is of mystery in religion, to
endeavour to explain and prove by reason is
a vain attempt. It is sufficient if we can
shew there is nothing absurd or repugnant
in our belief of those points; and instead
of framing hypotheses to explain them, we use
our reason only for answering the objections
brought against them. 4
It is vain to try to explain and prove the mysterious by
reason according to Berkeley which is evidence that he
does not, for all his talk about reasonableness and
1. Cf. Chanter V.
2. P, #156.
3. ALC, vii, #15.
4. ALC, vii, #15.
.
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probability, completely give up his idea that reason
should stay out of the realm of the mysterious. If so,
this is still a double truth, ^ and his criterion is
Scripture and the accepted doctrines of the Church.
As noted the general mood of the Alciphron and
Siris is different. For the most part, now, Berkeley is
anxious to prove the reasonableness of religious faith.
There are mysteries in science as well as religion, so that
this is no argument against the possibility of the truth of
the mystery. This is an argumentum ad hominen against men
who reject that very thing in religion which they accept.
We are not attached to authority against
reason nor afraid of untrodden paths that
lead to truth, and are ready to follow a
new light when we are sure it is no "ignis
fatuus." Reason may oblige^a man to believe
against his inclinations..."
In the Sixth Dialogue of Alciphron, Alciphron
questions the foundations of revealed religion. Crito’s
answer is significant. He accuses the former of "doubtful
scruples and surmises, hastiness in judging, narrowness in
thinking..." He asserts that those who returned to the
fountainhead in Christ satisfied "themselves of the truth
of those facts which they believed." "it is clear", is
asserted again and again as proof of the basis of knowledge
with regard to Christ and the beginnings of Christianity.
1. Cf. double truth in connection with creation.
2. ALC, vii, #21.
3. ALC, vi, #30.
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Referring to the former points he says,
these points appear to me clear and sure,
and... if they should not be admitted for
morally certain, as I believe they will
by fair and unprejudiced inquirers, yet
the allowing them to be only probable is
sufficient .. .Give me leave to say that
nothing dark, nothing incomprehensible,
or mysterious, or unaccountable, is the
ground or motive, the principle or founda-
tion, the proof or reason of our faith...
Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help
thinking there are points sufficiently
plain, clear, and full, whereon a man may
ground a reasonable faith in Christ.-^
When Alciphron still persists in the question because first
hand knowledge and demonstration is not possible, Crito
answers
:
Knowledge, I grant, in a strict sense,
cannot be had without evidence or demonstra-
tion: but prooable arguments are a suf-
ficient ground of faith. . .For although the
light of truth be unchangeable, the same in
its eternal source, the Father of lights:
yet with respect to us, it is variously
weakened and obscured .. .^
In the last dialogue of Alciphron, viewing the
variety of opinions about religion, in opposition to the
laziness and superficiality of the minute philosophers,
Berkeley proposes that
One of more spirit and a jus ter way of thinking
makes /variety of opinions about religion/
a step whence he looks about and proceeds
to examine, and compare the differing in-
stitutions of religion. He will observe
which of these is the most sublime and
rational in its doctrines, most venerable
in its mysteries, most useful in its precepts.
1. ALC, vi, #30.
2. ALC, vi, #12, 32
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most decent in its worship? Which create th
the noblest hopes, and most worthy views?
He will consider their rise and progress:...
He will inquire, which best accords with
nature and his tory? . . .He will be careful to
separate human alloy from that which is
Divine; and upon the whole form his judgment
like a reasonable free-thinker."
A concluding statement of the minute philosophers
puts the situation very ably. Alciphron has just stated
that the ultimate conclusion of their sect was skepticism
and Crito . answers
:
Sceptic as you are, you own it probable
there is a God, certain that the Christian
religion is useful, possible it may be
true .. .Certainly if you doubt all opinions
you must doubt of your own; and then, for
aught you know, the Christian may be true...
But whatever uncertainty there may be in
other points, thus much is certain: --either
there is or is not a God: there is or is
not a revelation. . .If the negatives are not
sure, the affirmatives are possible. If
the negatives are improbable the affirmatives
are probable... 2
In the Alciphron we have a combination of the
pragmatic and coherence criteria which is in effect but
one since the latter absorbs the former. Berkeley states
his purpose to show "that faith may be of use although its
object is not distinctly apprehended".
3
The criterion of
usefulness which in Dialogue iv, Alciphron- rejects as not
proving "the existence of a thing" argued about, along
1. ALC, vii
,
#29.
2. ALC, vii, #24.
3. ALC, vii #16.
4. ALC, iv, #2.
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with his rejection of authority and the historic arguments,
shows certain propositions in religion to he useful and
probable, if not certain.
At the same time, the quotation at the end of the
first chapter is evidence of. a coherence criterion and was
proposed in connection with proving the reasonableness of
Christianity. 1 Crito affirms his faith that this can be
shown. Christianity is a coherent whole. The universe is
a unity due to one supreme Person. Truth is essentially
and eternally one in the "Father of lights" and although
it has become obscured and weakened because of us or the
media through which it must be translated, yet if we
persist in our efforts we shall find truth.
1. ALC, vi, #12, 32
• • P I L I
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CHAPTER IX
ONE UNIVERSE
Berkeley's life-long quest was for truth. Thus
he came to the concluding paragraph of his last published
work with these words:
There is no subject so obscure but we may
discern some glimpse of truth by long
poring on it. Truth is the cry of all,
but the game of a few. Certainly where
it is the chief passion, it doth not give
way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it
contented with a little ardour in the
early time of life; active, perhaps, to
pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise.
He that would make a real progress in know-
ledge, must dedicate his age as well as
youth, the latter growth as well as first
fruits, at the altar of Truth.
1
Truth was no static thing but the activity and
life of an organic living whole. Indicative of Berkeley'
use of the coherence criterion is the title of his last
work, Siris » i.e. a chain with each link, linked or in-
volved with another and another. His system is not one
of logical implication but the involvement of every'
aspect of life with some other so that Berkeley states
that "all things together may be considered as one
universe; one by connexion, relation, and order of its
parts, which is the work of mind. 11 ^
1. SIR, #368; Cf. Lovejoy, GCB
2. SIR, #347. Cf. 287, 288.
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We shall attempt a brief survey of the system of
Siris, its connections with his previous thought and its
ultimate significance in Berkeley. There are links in the
chain that reach beyond what' one can know through the
senses, beyond the evident, into the realm of the most
/
coherent hypothesis; this is a system of transcendance
gained by the mind which leaves behind prejudices and
false opinions" and struggles "to recover ... truth and
intellectual ideas. "~
1.
Relations in Berkeley’s System
i. Earlier Works
What is the significance of relations in Berkeley’s
system? The notations concerning relations in the Common -
2place Book are very much alike in asserting that we have
no idea of relations. Sense experience or perception does
not give us relations, according to Berkeley.
In the second edition of the Principles using
"notion" in his specialized sense, Berkeley says:
We know and have a notion of relations
between things or ideas; which relations
are distinct from the ideas or things
related, inasmuch as the latter may be
perceived by us without our perceiving
the former. 0
Although sense experience presents only more or
less isolated data to the mind, there is nevertheless a
1. SIR, #314; Cf. 340,341.
2. CB, 136,460,506,545, 550,688,746,752,865.
3. P, #89.
Vt
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connection between the ideas and things of sense. The
passive ideas are "concreted and blended together
1
'^
with one another. The primary qualities "extension,
figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities
are inconceivable . "^ There is a "steadiness, order and
coherence" in ideas of sense, "the admirable connexion
whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence
of its Author."'5 Nature is an organic system sustained
by the Infinite. "The more a man knows of the connexion
of ideas, the more he may be said to know of the nature
of things. 4 This connection or relation is not known by
sense experience but by inference or reasoning from sense.
The general laws of nature are the set rules and estab-
lished methods wherein the Eternal Mind excites in us
the ideas of sense. 5 They are an example of the order and
coherence of the universe. This order of nature (archetypes)
relative to any one finite perceiver or the whole company
of finite minds, is external and archetypal. There is but
one order of nature, however varied the apprehension of it
may be and this order but not its content is recognized
by means of conceptual thought. This leads us to the
1. P, #99.
2. P, #10.
3. P, #30; Cf. #36.
4. D, 464; Cf. 395-396; 421.
5. P, #30.
* .
t
thought of Siri s in which Berkeley connects the ascending
scale of existence by the aether or pure invisible fire
which pervades all things.
^
ii. Relations in Siris
Berkeley begins with a suggested panacea (tar-
water) for all the physical ills of mankind; he sees that
this involves the question of the ultimate cause of this
cure-all. Thus Berkeley begins with animal and vegetable
life and his inquiry treats mechanical and then chemical
explanations. He notes that a body "either animal or
vegetable may be considered as an organized system of
tubes and vessels, containing several sorts of fluids..."
2
Thus plants or animals are very complicated or intricate
machines. The oil of the firs and pines developed by the
action of the plant and the sun is so potent in its action
that it leads to an inquiry into chemical phenomena. The
"acid spirit" is supposed to reside in Air or the vivifying
spirit.
Upon the whole it is manifest that air
is no distinct element, but a mass or
mixture of things the most heterogeneous
and even opposite to each other (137,145)
which become air by acquiring an
elasticity and volatility from the at-
traction of some active subtle substance
...fire, aether, light or vital spirit
of the worid.
3
1. SIR, #303
2. SIR, #32.
3. SIR, #147
\
Phenomena and effects arranged as the order and course of
things show very plainly that there is a Mind that moves,
a Providence that presides and ‘‘governs and actuates this
mundane system as the proper real agent and cause.
Thus Berkeley passes from chemistry to metaphysics in his
speculation about this invisible fire. He traces the
history of this idea from Horaclitus onward.
2
Fire is
the animal spirit of the visible or natural world which
is diffused in various degrees in nature.
This is no final explanation. The chain is only
physical and cannot support itself. All sensible phenomena
presuppose the operation of active reason. “The mechanical
philosopher. . .inquires properly concerning the rules and
modes of operation alone and not concerning the cause:
forasmuch as nothing mechanical is or really can be a
cause . “3 Berkeley likewise finds inadequate any explana-
tion of nature by minute particles but finds that the
agitation must be according to the laws of some other agent.
The phenomena of nature “form not only a magnifi-
cent spectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining and
instructive Discourse," 5 or, ss he formerly said, language.
Everything that occurs in nature shows that nature is
1. SIR, #154.
2, SIR, #166-205; esp. #138.
5. SIR, #249; Cf. 251.
4. SIR, #250.
5. SIR, #254.
, . .
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"under the direction of one Agent concerting all for one
end, the supreme good." 4
In seeking a coherent explanation Berkeley reasons
from all that may “be observed in nature, from its connected-
ness and the natural adaptation of means to ends, to the
implication that all is d.irected finally to one end* the
Supreme Good. 2 There is no accounting for phenomena other-
wise than as the effect of the Supreme Agent. In the
sections that follow Berkeley accumulates the testimony of
authorities from the whole course of history of philosophy
to support his position. This was a comprehensive task and
is evidence not of his using a criterion of authority but
rather the coherence of the truth by whomever discovered.
God is the Intelligible Soul of the universe
whose perpetual activity connects all things in the unity
of the "Golden Chain," Thus all things finally center in
the unity of Mind which causes and comprehends and sustains
all. This "Divine Agent doth by his virtue permeate and
govern the elementary fire or light which serves as animal
spirit to enliven and actuate the whole mass, and all the
members of this visible world."
3
"There runs a chain
throughout the whole system of beings. In this chain one
link drags another. The meanest things are connected with
the highest." 4 "All things together may be considered one
1. SIR, #258.
2. SIR, #260.
3. SIR, #291.
4. SIR, #303.
-.
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universe, one by connexion, relation and order of parts."
This gives unity, stability, and reality to things. But
what of finite centers of existence or persons? What is
their relation to "the One"?
The person or mind of created finite beings is
a unity or center of real existence. "Our minds participate
so far of existence as they do of unity... Personality is
the indivisible centre of the soul or mind ... Therefore
Person is really that which exists; inasmuch as it
participates the Divine Unity."'*" Berkeley emphasizes that
there is "in the soul of man, prior and superior to in-
tellect ... a higher nature, by virtue of which we are
one ... and by means of our one or unit, we are most
closely joined to the Deity,
Thus all things considered, the universe is one
by connection, relation, order, meaning and value. It is
a system that is bound together by the relation of a
Divine Causal Agent to that which is given as the whole
universe of his activity. The self and its world are
conjoined in one universe. The several beings which compose
the universe are parts of the same system; they combine to
carry on one end, and perfect one whole.
1. SIR, #346* Cf. 347, 356
2. SIR, #345; Cf. 275.

2.
Changes to be Noted in Berkeley’s Thought.
There is a tendency in Berkeley’s later works,
especially Siris to dethrone sense experience in empirical
knowledge and instead recognize the importance of con-
ceptual thought, e.g., “order" .vs. "archetypes". There
can be no coherent thought about reality as a whole un-
less this is true. "The principles of science are
neither objects of sense nor imagination. .. .intellect and
reason are alone sure guides to truth."
1
in this con-
nection, Berkeley more and. more talks of the ideas of
sense or nature as phenomena which are fleeting, changing,
without anything permanent in them.^ "But when we enter
the province of philo sophia prime.
.
we discover another
order of beings — Mind and its acts; permanent being;...
not resulting nor connected, nor contained, but contain-
'z
.
ing, connecting, enlivening the whole frame... Consequently
our knowledge of sensible things is only opinion; and
"although the mind may use both sense and fancy as means
whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far
forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing... Science consists
not in passive perceptions, but in the reasoning upon
them..."^ Strictly, the sense knows nothing." 0 "Hence
1. SIR, #264.
2. SIR, #292, 293, 303, 304, 305, etc.
3. SIR, #293.
4. SIR, #305.
5. SIR, #253; Cf. Kant.

that perpetual struggle.... thirst, and endeavour after
truth and intellectual ideas. If we will not despond
but continue to struggle into the upper region of the
intellectual life, we. shall attain at least a degree of
truth. 2
This noted change is not just one, but two,
closely related. On the one hand Berkeley dethrones sense
for intellect and reason; on the other hand he emphasizes
the stability and unity of the system of God by contrast
with the fleeting flux of appearance. This is a whole-
some change wrought by coherence. Indeed Siris is the
record of Berkeley’s attempt at synthesis and coherence.
1. SIR, #314.
2. SIR, #340,341
-.
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CHAPTER X
CRITERIA OR CRITERION?
Any serious inquiry has as its goal, knowledge
and truth. It presupposes that some knowledge is pos-
sible and that reality is orderly, rational, knowable.
The development and statement of a philosophy
is an attempt to establish a coherent system of the
whole of experience and reality. It is the faith that
back of this world of language and dismembered experi-
ence there lies the world as it really is.
Berkeley believed that it was possible to find
truth but that "men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge
anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where
*tis to be found.
1. Y/hat is Truth?
George Berkeley believed that truth about reality
was one coherent whole and that our failure to find it so
was perhaps not due to "any darkness and intricacy in the
objects or natural defect in the understanding so much as
from false principles which have been insisted on."^ His
philosophy is an attempt to rid thought about reality
1. CB, 525.
2. P, Introd. #4
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from falseness, skepticism, inconsistencies, contradictories,
the repugnant, the unnecessary and establish, a coherent
system. Truth was to be found not in isolated atoms but
in the connections of reality.
2. Evidence for Coherence Criterion
i. Berkeley’s method is that of empiricism and what he calls
common sense. The former is to be interpreted in the larger
sense of all that is present to consciousness through ideas
of sense and notions of spirits and relations. Common
sense is "the improved reason of thinking men." In other
words, Berkeley’s method provides for coherent thinking
about experience and reality.
ii. The inclusiveness of Berkeley’s knowledge of the
history of philosophy in Siris as well as the thought of
his day; the broad scope of his writings, i.e. psychology,
mathematics, religion, morality, politics, epistemology
and metaphysics; the ability to anticipate and answer
objections; are all indicative of Berkeley’s acknowledg-
ment of a coherence criterion, or at least of an insight
that truth is wholeness.
iii. Berkeley’s universe is not a universe of two radically
different substances, spirit and matter but a unity of
spirits and ideas. Spirits are active and ideas are passive.
Ideas have no absolute independent existence but exist only
r.
:
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in relation to percipient mind: "esse is percipi " . Nature
is the totality of the ideas of sense. In his early thought,
Berkeley speaks of the certainty of sense experience and
makes the validity of knowledge of nature depend upon what
can he sensed. But that sense experience is inadequate as
a criterion is evident from his later thought, especially
the Siris
,
when he speaks of nature as in a state of flux,
as fleeting and calls knowledge of sense, appearance.
"Intellect and reason" are "alone sure guides to truth."
iv. Berkeley’s immaterielism is grounded logically and
empirically in his " esse is percipi " principle. Had his
criterion been general consent, Berkeley would probably
have been a materialist. Matter is unnecessary, indeed
contradictory in a coherent account of reality. Its exist-
ence cannot be empirically verified. That matter can be
3
ultimate as well as mind, and that an "unknowable somewhat"
can communicate ideas are "repugnant", contradictory and
incoherent assertions. To hold the hypothesis that matter
is object, archetype, substratum, cause, instrument, oc-
casion, or something unknown but necessary, is to hold a
hypothesis that is contradictory to what can be verified,
does not account for sense experience, and it is not the
most coherent hypothesis. Had Berkeley’s criterion of
truth been practical results or consequences it is probable
that he might have been a naturalist or materialist since
he would not then have needed to consider the coherence of
..
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matter. But since his criterion was coherence he was
obligated to consider the coherence or incoherence of
matter. Immaterialism is supported by the interrelations
of all experience in a consistent and coherent whole,
v. Since ideas are passive and inert and spirits active,
knowledge of spirits cannot logically be through passive
ideas, Berkeley calls the experience by which we have
knowledge of spirits (and relations), notions. Knowledge
of self is immediate and of other finite spirits and God
is mediate by means of notions, which are inferences from
the ideas their agency excites in the self. It may also
be an inference by analogy from knowledge of the self,
Nature is the Divine Language; so from the system, order,
and coherence of nature as well as from the coherent
design in nature, one can infer both the existence and
something of the nature of God, Thus knowledge of the
existence of other spirits is
#
not tested in intuition,
nor by sense experience alone, nor even by practical
results but by a coherent view of a system inferred from
sense experience and notions. Knowledge of self is
tested by "mature reflection" ( Siris ) , that the self
or person is a unity, "of all created things seemeth
alone indivisible." It is the knowing self that relates,
identifies, experiences succession. It is a center which
coherently organizes the variety and continuity of ideas
and notions
..
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vi. Berkeley further escapes subjectivism and solipsism
by the doctrine of Archetypes (Dialogues and Siris .
implicit in the Principles ) . These archetypes are the
referents of human ideas and as such bring greater
coherence into Berkeley's system because they account
for an objective system of nature and experience of a
common world. This insures the possibility of verifica-
tion and guarantees the possibility of certain perceptions.
vii. Berkeley's “ esse is percipi “ and his original
personalistic intuition: “nothing but persons, i.e.
conscious things do exist... “ are together the essential
basis of Berkeley's immaterialism. But Berkeley does
not appeal to intuition as the test of truth. Intuitions
may be valuable and they were in Berkeley's thought since
they seemed to give him a view of a whole where sense
experience and common sense saw only parts. Berkeley’s
intuitions are tested by sense and thought—by order and
design.
Berkeley makes some use of general consent as
noted in the New Theory of Vision
,
the Principle
s
and
elsewhere, but only when the doctrine does not contradict
other evidence and when it is supported by evidence or as
being the most coherent hypothesis. Thus neither intuition
nor general consent is used as an independent criterion of
truth.
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viii, Berkeley’s treatment of “Vision and Spatial Extension"
shows some use of sense experience, general consent, and
practical results. But the appeal to judgment based on
experience and the connection of vision with the system and
design of nature is a use of coherence. The objects of
vision constitute the Universal Language of the Author of
Nature. Berkeley’s treatment is incoherent with the rest
of his system because he did not actually deny the exist-
ence of tactual objects external to the mind. He corrected
this in the Principles .
Berkeley’s treatment of mathematics shows that
he considered the analytic, abstract, mathematical system
of reasoning as meaningless unless grounded in experience
and related to reality as a whole. Berkeley’s use of the
coherence criterion made him exceedingly critical of the
mathematicians and natural scientists of his day and in-
volved a theory of reality.
ix. In Berkeley’s treatment of morality there is a change
in his use of criterion. In Pass ive Obedience, following
a suggestion in the Commonplace Book. Berkeley attempted
to prove a system of universal moral rules, a system of
implication, of logically necessary precepts. Thus he
rejects the "Authority of Holy Scripture", the "authority
of learned men", universal agreement and consent of nations,
innate ideas and Divine Ideas for mathematical or deductive
reason. In Alciphron involvement becomes more important.
’•I-
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Berkeley realized that deductive reason can be valid only
if the premises have an empirical grounding. He considers
now competing theories and takes a broad empirical view of
morality. One test of truth is seen to be practical
consequences but Berkeley* s emphasis on logical consistency
and the interrelations of morality with value, religion and
the universe as a whole indicates that he goes beyond the
pragmatic criterion and seeks coherence.
x. Berkeley *s treatment of revealed religion indicates
a mixture of churchman and philosopher. On the one hand
he attempts to prove the usefulness and reasonableness
,
or the coherence of Christianity, and on the hand, as
churchman he opposes novelties and innovations in religion
and disputes about "holy mysteries" that are "altogether
above our knowledge". In these instances he recognizes
the validity of Biblical authority as criterion. Berkeley’s
treatment of the problem of evil and his view of creation
are instances of incoherence. He treats the problem of
evil dogmatically rather than empirically. Finite spirits
do not have the advantage of a comprehensive view. That
which is called evil is actually necessary to promote a
good end.
Berkeley’s view of creation involves a contradiction
in his thought
.
since he vacillates between the view that ideas
are eternal and uncreated in God and the view that God pro-
duces the ideas. Involved also is his interpretation of the
Mosaic account of creation, that creation was willing the
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eternal ideas perceptible to finite creatures.
Thus Berkeley has a double -truth in revealed
religion.
xi. Berkeley is not strictly a particularist
,
nominalist
sensationalist, occasionalist or realist, although at
times he hints at each. In his early works Berkeley em-
phasizes the importance of sense experience, its certainty,
its particularity in opposition to inconsistent abstractions.
One can have no sensation of a concept or universal but this
does not exclude notional knowledge of the significance of
the particulars in the relation which they bear to the
universal elements in experience. Universals, as words,
are signs of likeness or similarity which exists in
particulars. Universals, likewise, are in the relation
which similar particulars bear to one another. The laws
of nature, the eternal rules of reason, the Divine Ideas,
established methods, connection, order and system are all
an acknowledgment of the importance of universals and
relations. The latter is seen most fully in the Siris .
Berkeley is not a sensationalist since the most
important kind of knowledge is not of sensation. He is
not an occasionalist because ideas have an archetypal
existence. He is not a realist because although ideas
are real things, this does not mean that they have any
real, material, spatial existence external to the percipient
mind.
,
Thus these allegations cannot be proved and there-
fore do not destroy the coherence of Berkeley’s thought.
xii, Berkeley’s philosophy is a systematic, comprehensive,
coherent whole. This is best seen in the Siris where
coherence comes to its most complete expression. The
universe is essentially one. "All things together may be
considered as one universe; one by connexion, relation,
and order of parts.” "We have no proof either from experi-
ment or reason of any other agent or efficient cause than
Mind or Spirit.” The chain of connection from the lowest
order of nature to the highest active reason or intellect
is actuated by the principle of fire or light or intellect.
The world of nature or sense experience is appearance.
But when "Intellect begins to dawn ... we then perceive
the true principle of unity, identity and existence."
"The One ... gives unity, stability and reality to things."
"The One" guarantees its coherence.
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ABSTRACT
The problem of this dissertation is to discover
what criterion or criteria of truth George Berkeley uses
in establishing his system of thought. The only criteria
to which Berkeley seems to apDeal are sense experience,
practical results and (most important) coherence.
If Berkeley’s chief criterion is coherence, does
he achieve coherence in his system? If his later thought
is a complete reversal of his original position, is the
change in the direction of greater coherence? Allegations
in recent writings that Berkeley was a sensationalist,
nominalist, occasionalist, realist, or subjectivist, if
they could be proved, would destroy Berkeleian idealism as
a coherent philosophical system.
Sense experience as a criterion tests givenness,
but the meaning of the given requires the test of a higher
standard, establishing its relation to the rest of experience.
Practical results, like sense experience, furnish data which
require further testing. Thus both sense experience and
practical results appeal to a further criterion, which with
Berkeley is coherence. The coherence criterion as here
treated, is not to be viewed In the narrow sense of deductive
or formally logical consistency (mere implication) but in-
cludes also the logic of involvement (so Hughes and Dewey).
Valid inference from the latter is based on the causal
relation and the entirety of experience. The coherence
..
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criterion involves the combined tests of systematic con-
sistency, inclusiveness, and the interrelation of the parts
to the whole and the whole to the parts.
In order to discover the extent to which Berkeley
applies these or other criteria, it is necessary to envisage
his system as a whole. The key to his philosophy is the
personalis tic intuition that "nothing properly but persons,
i.e., conscious things do exist. All other things are not
so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons."
In his last work, Siris , his original intuition is restated
in other words and further grounded in additional reflections
and reasonings. "Upon mature reflexion, the person or mind
of all created things seemeth alone indivisible and par-
taketh most of unity. But sensible things are.. .in a per-
petual f lux .. .Neverthe le ss, all things together may be
considered as one universe; one by connexion, relation,
and order of its parts, which is the work of mind" (347).
This connectedness or coherence is, however, not always
evident in the unfolding of his system.
Berkeley’s universe is composed of active spirits
and passive ideas. Ideas exist only in relation to percipi-
ent mind; " esse is percipi " . Nature is the totality of the
ideas of sense. Knowledge of nature is validated by sense
experience. That sense experience was found to be an
inadequate criterion for testing the meaning and signifi-
cance of sense knowledge may be inferred from his later

thought (Siris ) when he speaks of nature as appearance
and in a state of flux, and of "intellect and reason"
as sure guides to truth.
Berkeley’s "esse is percipi " and his original
personalistic intuition are the essential basis of his
immaterialism. But he does not appeal to intuition as a
test of truth, nor is any use which he makes of general
consent to be interpreted as such. He uses the latter
only when it does not contradict what can be empirically
verified. Therefore neither intuition nor general consent
is used as an independent criterion. Berkeley supports
his immaterialism further by proofs that matter is un-
necessary, indeed contradictory, in a coherent account
of reality. That matter is ultimate as well as mind, and
that an "unknowable somewhat" can communicate ideas, are
"repugnant", contradictory and incoherent assertions. Had
Berkeley’s criterion of truth been practical consequences,
it is probable that he might have been a naturalist and
materialist, for he would have been free from the obliga-
tion to consider the coherence of "matter". Berkeley’s
immaterialism presupposes a coherence criterion since it
is supported by the interrelations of all experience and
its harmonization in a consistent and coherent whole.
Ideas are passive and inert, and knowledge of
active spirits (and relations) cannot together be through
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such ideas; Berkeley calls the experience hy which we know
the latter, notions. Knowledge of oneself is immediate
and of other finite spirits and God is mediate by means
of notions inferred from the ideas their agency excites
in the self and from analogical reasoning. Nature is the
Divine Language. Prom the general order and coherence as
well as the coherent design in nature, one can infer not
only the being but also the nature of God. Thus know ledge
of the existence and nature of other spirits is not tested
by intuition, nor by sense experience alone, nor even by
practical results but by a consistent and coherent view of
a system inferred from sense experience and notions.
Berkeley further escapes subjectivism and
solipsism by his doctrine of archetypes which was unfolded
in his Dialogue s and Siris
,
being implicit in his discussion
in the Principles and already hinted at in the CPB. These
archetypes are not independent of all minds but are in the
mind of God and bring greater coherence into Berkeley’s
whole system, since they are the referents of human ideas
and account for an objective system of nature and experience
of a common world.
Berkeley is not strictly a particularist,
nominalist, sensationalist, occasiona list, or realist.
Although he emphasizes that all sense experience is
particular and that one can have no sensation of a universal,
this does not exclude notional, conceptual knowledge of the
..
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significance of the particulars in the relation which they
bear to the universal elements in experience. Universals,
as words, are signs of a likeness or similarity which exists
in particulars. Universals do not exist outside all minds
but universality is the relation which similar particulars
bear to one another. Berkeley* s recognition of the laws
of nature, the eternal rules of reason, established methods,
connection of ideas, regularity, order, etc., is an ack-
nowledgment of the importance of universals and relations.
He is not a sensationalist because the most important kind
of knowledge is not of sensation. The world of idea-
things has an existence independent of finite minds and may
be perceived according to established conditions. Although
ideas are real things, this does not mean that they have
any real material, spatial existence external to mind.
Berkeley’s moral philosophy indicates a change
in doctrine, method and criterion. In Passive Obedience ,
following a suggestion in the Commonplace Book
,
Berkeley
intended to prove a system of universal moral rules. He
rejects the "Authority of Holy Scripture", "Authority of
learned men", universal agreement and consent of nations,
innate ideas and "Divine Ideas", in favor of deductive or
even mathematical reason as his criterion in the discovery
and proof of moral laws. Here implication triumphs over
involvement.

In the Alciphron , Berkeley abandons the attempt
to prove universal moral rules. His method becomes more
empirical and comprehensive, and the scope of his knowledge
of competing ethical doctrines widens. He rejects sensual
pleasure as the highest good and "honour” as the source of
virtue, Berkeley's test here is partly pragmatic in that
he considers practical consequences but his emphasis on
logical consistency (inference) and his consideration of
the interrelatedness (involvement) of morality with value,
religion and the universe as a whole indicate that his
predominant criterion is coherence.
Berkeley's treatment of revealed religion
indicates a mixture of churchman and philosopher. On the
one hand he attempts to prove the usefulness and reasonable-
ness, or coherence of Christianity, and on the other hand
he opposes, "innovations in religion” and the demonstration
of holy mysterie s, recognizing the validity of authority or
tradition as criterion. The former attitude is a develop-
ment which comes late in his system and is an indication of
his use of coherence especially in his treatment of
Christianity. The latter is to be seen at any period in his
philosophy and is a defect in his use of coherence. Doctrine
which also undermine the consistency and coherence of his
system are his treatment of the problem of evil and his view
of creation. The former is treated dogmatically rather
than empirically and the latter involves a contradiction
-.
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in Berkeley’s thought, since he vacillates between the
view that ideas are eternal and uncreated in God, and
the view that God "produces” the ideas.
Berkeley’s method is that of empiricism, all
that is present to consciousness, and (he asserts) of
common sense or the "improved reason of thinking men".
This is coherence. The breadth of Berkeley's knowledge,
interest, criticism and writing are all evidence of a
coherence criterion.
Berkeley's thought moved from the disjointed
entries of the Commonplace Book, through the atomistic
ideas and connected notions of the Principles ; was
introduced to the eternal archetypes in the Dialogue
s
}
hampered by the deductions of Passive Obedience advanced
by the inductions of the Alei phron
>
and found in the
Siris the coherence criterion in operation. Siris is
"a chain” of implication and involvement that connects
his whole system. This work ends but the quest for
truth moves on. Truth is not atomistic or static; truth
is an organic living, growing whole.
The main contributions of this dissertation are
as follows:
1. Berkeley’s criterion of truth is not sense
experience or practical results, but coherence, (implication
and involvement).
.
2, An exception, is his recognition of the
criterion of authority of Scripture in revealed religion
which results in a double truth and the almost exclusive
use of implication in the Passive Obedience .
3* Coherence comes to its fullest expression
in the Siris .
4, Berkeley* s use of coherence resulted in:
i, Immaterialism: Denial of existence to
the contradictory, the unknowable, the
unnecessary, the incoherent,
ii, A theory of the archetypal existence
of all things in God,
iii, A theory of the connectedness, the
interrelatedness, the systematic
coherence of all reality.
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